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6	Attorneys for plaintiffs LARRY and MELISSA SHIELDS	
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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY	
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11	LARRY SHIELDS, an individual, and MELISSA SHIELDS, an individual,	Case No. BC 346 249
12	Plaintiffs,	[assigned for all purposes to the Honorable Soussan G. Bruguera, Judge, dept. 71]
13		2. 2. aguera, vaage, aept. 71]
14	vs.	(PDCPCCED) ORDER AND FINDINGS ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
15		DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
16	THE COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT	
17	AGENCY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1	Hearing: Date: October 25, 2007
18	through 100, inclusive,	Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept.: 71
19	Defendants.	-
20	Plaintiffs LARRY and MELISSA SHIELDS' motion for determination of attorney's fees	
21	came on regularly on October 25, 2007, in department 71 of the above entitled court, the	
22	Honorable Soussan Bruguera, Judge, presiding. Counsel for plaintiff and defendant submitted on	
23	papers.	
24	On December 13, 2002, plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Shields ("the Shields"), purchased a	
25	single-family home from the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles	
26	("CRA") for \$210,000.	
27	The Shields obtained a first mortgage from conventional sources and the CRA took back	
28	a silent second, deferred-interest, mortgage of \$45,800.	

The second trust deed and the deferred second mortgage note stated, *inter alia*, that if the house was sold before the Shields had lived in the house for five years, then the Shields would owe the principal (\$45,800) plus either 7% non-compounded interest per year or 50% of the appreciation in value, whichever was greater. If the Shields stayed more than five years before selling the house, then they would owe the principal plus either 7% non-compounded interest per year or 50% of the appreciation in value, whichever was the lesser.

On December 27, 2005, the Shields decided to sell the house after their son was murdered. A buyer paid \$540,000 for the house. The CRA contended that it is entitled by the terms of the note, and the second trust deed, to the principal of \$45,800 plus 50% of the appreciation (\$330,000 minus any amounts spent by the Shields that increased their basis).

On January 23, 2006, the Shields filed suit against the CRA seeking to invalidate the shared appreciation provision in the note and the deed. The Third Amended Complaint has four causes of action: 1) Violation of Civil Code section 2943 (failure to provide a legally timely written payoff demand when requested); 2) Violation of the state usury laws; 3) Declaratory Relief; 4) Violation of Civil Code section 1671 (invalid liquidated damages provision). The Shields had also requested a payoff demand statement from the CRA which the CRA never provided.¹

The CRA contended that it is neither in violation of state usury laws nor the state laws regarding liquidated damages nor any statutory prohibitions against pre-payment penalties. Moreover, it contended that it had a right to the principle and 50% of the appreciation under the note, and the second trust deed should be upheld because the Shields' sold the property after three years and thus failed to live in the house for at least five years. Plaintiff's made numerous attempts to resolve the case prior to filing their lawsuit.

The Court entered judgment and made findings against the Plaintiff on August 10, 2007. Those findings and judgment were not appealed and are now final.

The CRA does admit that after the Shields' multiple requests for a demand statement over several months and numerous discussions with the Shields' lawyer about the information required before the CRA could issue a written demand statement, the CRA ultimately never sent the requested statement.

The Court should note that the following benefits to the operating procedure of the Community Redevelopment Agency have inured to the public's benefit due to the issues and findings from this litigation.

- The CRA violated Civil Code section 2943 in its willful refusal to provide a
 payoff demand statement when requested by both the Shields and the escrow
 company. The public will benefit from the CRA timely processing payoff
 demands.
- The loan repayment terms in the promissory note and deed of trust violated State law as they are pre-payment fees, coupled with an acceleration clause, were unreasonable in amount and were in violation of Civil Code section 2954.10 and Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 541.14, which specifically preclude a prepayment fee when there is an acceleration clause in a deed of trust that is due on sale. The exposure of these violations will provide the further benefits the public.
- 3. In addition, the CRA took the position that the sale at issue was a credit or cash discount sale instead of it being a single transaction with one price by the seller who financed the sale with a deed of trust secured by the property. By trying to exempt itself from these very important consumer protection statutes, the CRA took a position that would have caused serious injuries to any of its borrowers who may not have the resources to bring a civil action against it. There was no evidence that the CRA ever offered a cash discount and their position was not supported by any evidence before the Court.
- The Court concluded that the prepayment statutes equally apply to the CRA. The Court further found that the requested prepayment penalty by the CRA was unconsciouable and in violation of numerous Civil Code sections relating to produce a propayment feed, and truth and lending disclosures. By exposing all of these practices, plaintiff's counsel has provided an invaluable public benefit.

The Court ordered that the plaintiffs' counsel shall be allowed to recover attorney's fees

and costs pursuant to a motion in compliance with Rule 3.1702 of the California Rules of Court.

The plaintiffs' counsel timely filed a motion and the matter was set for hearing on October 25, 2007 at 10:00am. The Court, after considering the arguments of counsel, the motion, the opposition, the reply, the declarations, and reviewing applicable law, makes the following findings:

Among the factors justifying a multiplier are the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them. The nature of the action was both difficult and novel requiring a creative approach to the litigation. Initially, counsel indicated to the Court that they participated in numerous discussions with counsel for the defendant to reach a resolution in light of the Shields' particular circumstances. They requested a variance from the CRA's strict interpretation of the repayment terms. Over \$90,000 was held in escrow for almost two years as the CRA would not provide a payoff demand statement and would not release the funds. The Shields also had to sign an indemnity agreement with the escrow company.

To make matters slightly more challenging, the CRA advanced different theories of how the loan terms were legal as plaintiffs' counsel presented argument, case law and statutory law. Not only did the CRA have able litigation counsel, they were not the only ones aware of the problems with the loan terms. The CRA apparently had additional counsel to interpret the terms of the loan. For each theory advanced by the CRA purportedly justifying the loan terms, counsel the problems with the theory was able to demonstrate that the CRA did not understand it was violating the laws protecting number of Complex people from just these types of loans. The CRA advanced a preciation loan, seller exemption from the prepayment laws, and others. Each theory required extensive research, briefing, and drafting.

Plaintiff achieved extraordinary results herein which should ultimately benefit the constituents of the City of Los Angeles and the Community Redevelopment Agency specifically. As an initial matter, counsel's creative problem-solving skills allowed the Shields to move forward with their lives without losing the proceeds from the sale of their home and while also being able to fight for justice against the CRA. Also, as a result of this action, there can be no further doubt by the CRA that the loan terms at issue herein are illegal. Thus, perhaps they will

be deterred from continuing to keep people's money and force them to file lawsuits to obtain a recovery.

As far as the level of skill is concerned, the level of representation far exceeded the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. The novel issues raised by the CRA's attorneys required a highly skilled advocate to litigate across numerous subjects, which plaintiffs' counsel did.

Finally, the most significant justification for the enhancement comes as a result of the contingent nature of the fee award. There was a high risk of loss. Numerous attorneys would not take a case against the CRA with its vast resources. The agreements are intimidating and there was very little money in the way of net recovery to the plaintiffs. The only way plaintiffs' counsel really could recover for their time in advancing this highly beneficial litigation was to recover attorney's fees. The Court finds the risk of non-payment was very high to plaintiffs' counsel.

The Supreme Court has held that the trial court first determines the lodestar method and then makes an adjustment, or multiplier, to compensate the attorney at a rate reflecting the risk of nonpayment in contingency cases as a class. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138, 17 P.3d 735, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 (*Ketchum*).) The aim is to compensate attorneys for their services at fair market value as an inducement to accept such matters. (*Ibid.*)

The nature of the contingent relationship and the risks associated by plaintiff's counsel in representing plaintiffs without payment is an important factor. In fact, a decision not to consider contingent risk in deciding not to apply a multiplier alone is reversible error. (*Greene v. Dillingham Constr.* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 426-427; see also *Sternwest Corp. v. Ash* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74. 75-76.)

The Court finds that the lodestar amount is \$57,520.00. The Court applies a 3X increase multiplier to bring the total fees awarded to \$172,560.00.

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THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's counsel, Law Offices of Ronald Richard & Associates shall be awarded \$172,560.00 to be paid forthwith.

October 29, 2007

The Honorable Soussan G. Bruguera Judge of the Superior Court