1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
2	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
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4	DEPARTMENT CENTRAL 130 HON. WILLIAM C. RYAN, JUDGE		
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6	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)		
7	PLAINTIFF,)		
8	VS.) CASE NO. BA298847		
9	CRAIG A. LAWSON,		
10	DEFENDANT.)		
11			
12	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
13	MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2006		
14			
15	APPEARANCES:		
16	FOR THE PEOPLE: STEVE COOLEY		
17	DISTRICT ATTORNEY BY: JAMES BELNA DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY		
18	DEFOIR DISTRICT ATTORNET		
19	FOR DEFENDANT: RONALD N. RICHARDS, ESQ.		
20	ATTORNEY AT LAW		
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27	RONALD H. KIM, CSR #12299, RPR. OFFICIAL REPORTER		
28	OFFICIAL REPORTER		

Barren and

A STANDARD

BA298847 CASE NUMBER: PEOPLE VS. CRAIG A. LAWSON CASE NAME: MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2006 LOS ANGELES, CA. DEPARTMENT C-130 HON. WILLIAM C. RYAN, JUDGE RONALD KIM, CSR NO. 12299 REPORTER: APPEARANCES: DEFENDANT CRAIG A LAWSON; PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, RONALD N. RICHARDS; JAMES BELNA, REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 9 10 People versus Craig Lawson, BA298847. 11 MR. RICHARDS: Good morning, Ronald Richards 12 appearing for Mr. Lawson, who's present in court. 13 MR. BELNA: James Belna, deputy district attorney, 14 for the People. THE COURT: This is here for motion to dismiss 16 based on the destruction of evidence. MR. RICHARDS: Yes, Your Honor. The last time in 18 court, I had a speedy trial motion. 19 THE COURT: Which I denied. 20 MR. RICHARDS: Yes, without prejudice, and you 21 invited me to file the Trombetta motion based on the 22 destruction of the evidence, and so we filed a motion 23 which encompassed three separate grounds for dismissal. 24 There was the Trombetta grounds, which I cited the Tenth 25 Circuit case and Ninth circuit case and the Sixth Amendment ground, ineffective assistance of counsel, and then the statutory grounds under Penal Code section 1054.

The case that's most closely on the point is United States versus Boil where they destroyed the nonconforming --

THE COURT: Let me stop you, Counsel.

Mr. Belna, I'm inclined to grant the motion on the Trombetta grounds and deny on the other grounds.

Do you wish to be heard?

MR. BELNA: Yes. I think that --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BELNA: I think the distinction has to be made in this case with other cases where the nature of the evidence was such that it would be apparent that it was susceptible to some sort of, I think, forensic examination, which could have resulted in another conclusion in the case, such as, the steel case that counsel referred to where certainly, if metallurgical content was in dispute, there would be testing that could be done that may well resolve something in the defendant's favor.

Here, I don't think we have that. I think we have merely a dispute as to what the actual evidence is or what it looked like when it was booked into evidence, and that I think is something that has to be determined by the trier of fact in this case.

There was nothing -- and if the evidence was as described by the police when it was booked into evidence, I don't think there's anything intrinsic to it in terms of being susceptible to further testing to find

something exculpatory about it.

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But, secondly, the other prong is on the Trombetta grounds, I think the Cooper case is clear that there has to be some showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecution in terms of the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the case. I don't think that's even really alleged here, but if it was, I don't think there's sufficient evidence to demonstrate that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Richards, you want to respond to any of that?

MR. RICHARDS: Well, what we set forth, Your Honor, was that this was a color scan. There was no test done.

THE COURT: By that, you mean it's a color copy?

MR. RICHARDS: No, a color scan.

THE COURT: What's the difference between that and the color copy?

MR. RICHARDS: Good question, Your Honor. If you scan it -- if you scan a check in like a scanner, it still could look like an original check.

THE COURT: So could a color copy?

MR. RICHARDS: Well, sometimes a color copy may create the void. It could -- normally, Your Honor, a scanner doesn't pick up the words "Void" on it because it's not copied, and it's just scanning the document.

It is a difference, and we set forth that this document did not contain the "might" or the magnetic ink character recognition on it and that the police did

no tests to verify what this document was. They merely copied it and put it in a drawer and then lost it or destroyed it, I mean.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's assume all that's true. Where's the bad faith?

MR. RICHARDS: The bad faith is that Detective
Hardemon has had a long history with this defendant and
has had two motions to suppress granted for him violating
constitutional rights in this case. He picked up my
client unauthorized from the Hawthorne Police Department
when he was released when the first case got dismissed on
his own and taunted him all the way down to the station
telling him that he had him on the perjury charge and
Detective Hardemon has had a long history in this case.

on the other defendant in this case, Mr. Belna merely offered to pay some of the restitution on Cedric Wright, the ringleader, and the case was going to be dismissed without even the charge. The original charges in this case, out of the ten or more against Mr. Lawson, this is the only one remaining.

And Detective Hardemon absolutely knew that this evidence was essential to us to show that the check was unusable, and by destroying it, we don't have to have him admit that he acted in bad faith. It's ipso facto bad faith by the fact that he has a color scan of the check, and then he doesn't have the postal inspector bring that out to show the alleged victim. They just

bring a copy which says "Void," and then I go to do my defense, and then I find out just within the last three weeks that now he's destroyed the check and never did any test to see whether this is a legitimate check, never brought it to the bank to see if it was a usable check, and then Detective Hardemon has creatively now eviscerated my entire defense, and that's why I'm prejudiced because I cannot call my expert to show that this check has no wet signature or no micro —

THE COURT: I don't know what a wet signature is.

MR. RICHARDS: A wet signature is, Your Honor, when you sign a check, you have a blue pen, and it's a real signature meaning it's a legit signature. In this case, if you destroy the actual document --

THE COURT: In law, we call that a sign manual.

MR. RICHARDS: A sign manual?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RICHARDS: No problem.

THE COURT: Signed by your own hand.

MR. RICHARDS: Element 4 of the possession charge, which I've cited at Page 4 in my brief says that the defendant has to have a genuine document. By Detective Hardemon having the evidence destroyed, he now has prevented us from showing that this document all along was an unusable document in the letter that he had that he had showed the alleged victim was dated two days after the check.

I mean all Detective Hardemon had was a

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Mr. Lawson for the parole violation, it was a factual impossibility for there to be any crime committed because even the letter was dated two days after this potential crime was alleged to have occurred.

This is not just some officer that's come out of the blue. He's had a long history of tormenting my client, and I don't believe that the cases on Boil or the Ninth Circuit case of Cooper require the defense to absolutely show that the officer hated the defendant. We had -- it's very rare.

I've never had a case in my career where the officer has a critical document, the essential corpus delicti and then intentionally destroys it and then blames it on his own department for destroying his own evidence. I mean, that's very convenient, but what we're really looking at is what's fair in a trial.

All along, I've been operating for six years under the assumption that I'm going to be able to show that this check is not usable, and then after my arraignment in front of this court I find out --

THE COURT REPORTER: Can you slow down please.

MR. RICHARDS: I find out that the detective has intentionally destroyed the only thing I had to show that this wasn't a usable item. That's not fair, and it's not my client's fault, and I don't think that the police should be rewarded to have to now have him sit through a trial to put on a defense that was a easy winner that was

created by the People themselves.

That's the prejudice. That's why he's prejudiced on the speedy trial grounds because due to this delay, he's now lost the essential evidence, and I think that the Court's tentative is what's fair and what's right.

How many times has this court seen cases where the police just destroy the critical piece of evidence? That's like losing the blood, the semen. It's gone, and that's why I can't effectively defend him without it. I can't pursue his defense, and they had a statutory obligation. He's trying to cabin the Court in simply constitutional analysis, but there's also statutory analysis.

The People have --

THE COURT REPORTER: You need to slow down please.

THE COURT: Mr. Richards, if you don't slow down,

I'm going to strike your argument.

MR. RICHARDS: Sorry.

The People are required to keep all of the discovery pursuant to 1054. They're not allowed to destroy the real evidence obtained as part of the case. If there is no other remedy to make up for the destroyed evidence that the People destroyed in this matter and to just try to make some very high bar that is only bad faith, is the analysis really ignores the rest of my brief.

I did not just cite constitutional grounds.

I've cited numerous other grounds, and it would be laughable to suggest Mr. Lawson could have effective assistance of counsel when the custodian responsible for holding onto the evidence destroyed my evidence.

I would have been happy to hold this evidence, but I wouldn't certainly look to the People if I lost my own evidence because the People have that burden. They have the burden to maintain the evidence, and this is the case where not only were we ready to go when he was arrested originally, but then he spent 60 days in custody in this case because the People waited the entire time, and then we were unable to proceed after 60 days and got those charges dismissed.

I mean this is not a case where the defense has done anything but diligently and diligently pursued Mr. Lawson's statutory rights in this case.

THE COURT: Anything you want to add Mr. Belna? He does get the last word.

MR. BELNA: If I can just briefly.

First, I mean, in terms of Counsel talking about being ready for last -- having certain expectations for the past six years, Mr. Lawson hasn't been on this case for six years. He was arrested on a parole warrant last December, and part of that, we have no idea where he was.

THE COURT: Apparently in state prison.

MR. BELNA: No. He was -- no. During that period, he wasn't in state prison. Well, whatever.

You filed this first in March of 2006; THE COURT: right? No. We filed it back in 2001. MR. BELNA: THE COURT: Is there a different case number? Yes. MR. BELNA: THE COURT: I see. What happened to that case? MR. BELNA: Well, that case there were four defendants. Three of them were resolved, and then Mr. Lawson was never arrested on that despite efforts to find him. 10 MR. RICHARDS: Objection. 11 MR. BELNA: Well, whatever. I'm just telling you 12 what our -- you can contest whether we have that or not, 13 but I'm just saying he was not arrested at that time. 14 The other ones were, and those cases were resolved. And then Mr. Lawson was picked up 16 concurrent with our arrest warrant. His parole officer had put a hold on him for not reporting, to my 18 understanding. THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. BELNA: He got picked up last December. 21 THE WITNESS: And that's when this case started? 22 MR. BELNA: Well, on the original case -- previous 23 case number to these charges, multiple charges actually. 24 After that period of time, we tried to put 25 the case together within the original statutory period, 26 discovered our evidence had been destroyed and ended up dismissing and refiling and then under a new case number, 28

here we are.

THE COURT: Here we are.

MR. BELNA: The only point I want to make is, first, I really wasn't too clear about what Counsel was talking about in his motion in terms of what he's lost, but if the motion is somehow he's lost some forensic test on his signature on the composition of the paper, I was not relying on that anyway.

I think my evidence is going to be this looks like enough of a check that it was useful to the defendant in terms of committing a fraud, and that was our evidence.

I wasn't relying on that it could have gone onto a particular machine and negotiated and whatever, and I don't think that's --

THE COURT: But with respect, you know, you're not the expert. You're the prosecutor.

MR. BELNA: I'm the prosecutor, but my point is, if it hinges on him not being able to say this was a particular type of signature or there wasn't particular type of a security thing on there that it could have been, if I have to, I'll take an adverse stipulation as to that, an adverse finding, which presumably would resolve counsel's issue, but I don't think it affects my case.

Quite frankly, I think under the fact that there was no bad faith here, I'm not even required to do that. But to the extent that I am required or the Court

thinks it's fair, I'll take an adverse stipulation as to whatever findings Counsel is purporting to say he would have had this -- you know, the Court can make an adverse finding against me saying this is what it would have shown had it been tested, and then, you know, we can go from there, and Counsel hasn't lost anything.

> THE COURT: Mr. Richards, you get the last word. MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.

With respect, Your Honor, it is not a crime to possess a copy of the check. That's the element of the offense that he's charged with. Without being able to show that there's no original signature, if he stipulated that it wasn't a usable document, then I would ask that he dismiss the case right now because that's the element of the offense.

So you can't arrest somebody for possession 17 | of a copy of a forged instrument or a potential forged instrument, and this is exactly why I was waiting to be able to cross-examine Detective Hardemon because I knew that he never did that test on the document.

And so I don't have to tell him my defense strategy in advance, and I was willing to -- I was waiting to do that, and by destroying it, they prevented me from put putting on his defense, and that's the prejudice, and it's not fair.

Okay. The Trombetta motion is THE COURT: granted, and the case is dismissed 1385.

MR. RICHARDS: The bond is exonerated?

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1	THE COURT: Is he out on bond?
2	MR. RICHARDS: \$100 bond.
3	THE COURT: Bond is exonerated.
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5	(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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12	I, RONALD H. KIM, OFFICIAL REPORTER OF THE		
13	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOR THE COUNTY		
14	OF LOS ANGELES, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING		
15	PAGES, 1 THROUGH 12, COMPRISE A FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT		
16	TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY TAKEN IN THE		
17	ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE ON OCTOBER 30, 2006.		
18	DATED THIS 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2006.		
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21	, CSR #12299, RPR.		
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