Pages 1 - 147

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

NO. CR 14-00278 RS VS.

ANTHONY PISARSKI and SONNY MOORE,

Defendants.

San Francisco, California Friday, July 28, 2017

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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24	
25	

1	INDEX		
2	Friday, July 28, 2017 - Volume 1		
3	GOVERNMENT'S WITNESSES	PAGE	VOL.
4	TINDELL, JASON (SWORN)	72	1
5	Direct Examination by Ms. Gilbert Cross-Examination by Mr. Richards	72 72 82	1 1
6	Redirect Examination by Ms. Gilbert Recross-Examination by Mr. Richards	99 101	1 1
7	Records Examination by Mr. Rechards	101	_
8	EXHIBITS		
9	GOVERNMENT'S EXHIBITS IDE	N EVID	VOL.
10	A through M	104	1
11	0	76	1
12	N	78	1
13			
14	DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS IDE	1 EVID	VOL.
15	100 through 109	27	1
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

Friday - July 28, 2017 1 10:13 a.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 THE CLERK: Calling case CR 14-0278, U.S.A. versus 4 5 Anthony Pisarski and Sonny Moore. 6 Counsel, please come to the podium and say your name for the record. 7 MS. GILBERT: Good morning, Your Honor. Helen Gilbert 8 on behalf of the United States. 9 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Gilbert. 10 11 MR. RICHARDS: Good morning, Your Honor. Richards on behalf of Anthony Pisarski. 12 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Richards. 13 MR. PALAZZO: And, Your Honor, Louis Palazzo appearing 14 15 on behalf of Sonny Moore, who's present at liberty. 16 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Palazzo. 17 Good morning, Mr. Moore and Mr. Pisarski. This is the time set for the hearing on the stay issue, if 18 I can call it that. Hopefully you-all did receive the order 19 that I issued. I thought it was useful to issue an order in 20 advance so that at least all the parties would know, having 21 read through your papers, how I saw the burden issue falling; 22 and so that, hopefully, will at least streamline our process a 23 bit. 24 Having determined that the burden is a preponderance 25

burden that the defendants shoulder, I'll look to the defendants to begin the hearing.

I have received your various submissions and have taken a look at it, but let me turn to whoever wants to proceed.

MR. PALAZZO: If I may, I just want to clarify a couple of housekeeping issues in advance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PALAZZO: We were under the impression, based upon predecessor counsel's interaction with us, Ms. Vartain specifically, that we would be able to entertain and the Court would entertain declarations.

We sought to elicit declarations in support of the hearing today and also in an effort to obviate the needless presentation of testimony beyond the declarations or whatever was sworn to in the declarations.

I had a little bit of a misunderstanding with respect to the Court's order as to whether the Court was requiring all of the testimony to be presented live and not by declaration; or whether the Court was simply saying, "I'm going to allow live testimony if someone wants to present live testimony."

THE COURT: Well, I was never party to any agreement about how this was going to proceed. So whatever Ms. Vartain may have agreed with Defense, I never got any stipulation of any kind. So as far as I'm concerned, the Court is not -- hasn't planned on how exactly this is supposed to play itself

1 out.

My order was simply to say to the extent that there was a suggestion in the papers that either I had agreed we weren't going to have live testimony or anyone had precluded it, I wanted to set the record straight that I did not, and I'm leaving it to the parties on how to proceed.

Now, with respect to the declarations, the Government has objected to certain of those on various evidentiary grounds; and absent some stipulation that I otherwise agreed to, I'm going to have to consider those objections.

So I'm not saying, in other words, that I will preclude consideration of declarations, but I just wanted to make it clear on the record, this is your standard evidentiary hearing from my standpoint. I haven't entered into any understanding nor have I issued any orders that say it's -- you know, "We're not going to have live testimony. We're going to have declarations." I didn't -- none of that was the case.

So I guess to answer your question, I'm not precluding consideration of declarations in the appropriate course, but you should also not assume that there is some game plan of which, at least I'm aware, that says how this is supposed to proceed.

MR. PALAZZO: I spoke with -- well, we spoke with

Ms. Gilbert this morning, and I think all counsel feel like
they're in somewhat uncharted, you know, waters with respect to

the *McIntosh* evidentiary hearing and whether or not there is an obligation to adamantly impose evidentiary requirements.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PALAZZO: And so to the extent that, you know, we were somewhat in the blind, if you will, and somewhat relying upon the representations and the agreement -- at least from our vantage point it was an agreement -- that we could supply declarations in lieu of live testimony -- that's what we're sort of falling back on, is the declarations -- in terms of demonstrating a prima facie case to the Court.

And so if they've got live testimony that they want to proceed with, of course, we don't oppose it and object to the presentation of live testimony to rebut the evidence that's been presented, but we think that the quality of the evidence via the declaration should support the *prima facie* showing because that was the intent behind presenting those declarations.

MR. RICHARDS: I've just got some additional comments for you if you don't mind.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me ask a question before that.

I mean, there have been a few proceedings. We've seen them. The parties have alerted me to them. Judge Drozd in the Eastern District of California. I believe Judge Chesney may have had one in my district. Some of those led to the McIntosh

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decision.
 1
          Did they -- were the evidentiary hearings in those cases
 2
     done in any particular way vis-a-vis the declaration issue?
 3
              MR. RICHARDS: In Gentile they stipulated that they
 4
 5
    use the affidavit.
                          In which case?
              THE COURT:
 6
 7
              MR. RICHARDS: Gentile, the one you cited in your
     order.
 8
              THE COURT:
                          Oh, okay.
 9
              MR. RICHARDS:
                             Yeah.
10
11
              THE COURT:
                          That was done by declaration?
              MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. And they called a live
12
13
    witness in the hearing.
          I didn't look at anybody being precluded from live
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15
     witnesses, but your order on Docket 173 ordered us to
16
    produce -- in the status report that Ms. Vartain discussed with
17
    us, it said we're to submit opening briefs and declarations.
18
          So I looked at it as --
              THE COURT: Well, that was leading -- of course.
19
20
     wanted the -- I wanted that material, paper material.
21
     doesn't mean I'm saying, "Oh, and, by the way, that will
     suffice and you never have to worry about making an evidentiary
22
23
     showing." You can't assume that from my order.
              MR. RICHARDS: No. Well, this is what we -- let me --
24
25
     we -- I have an extensive experience both in state and federal
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court on medical marijuana issues. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. RICHARDS: And so typically in state court there's 3 no Indictments and you have a preliminary hearing; and at the 4 5 preliminary hearing if you're going to present a medical defense --6 That's not just about marijuana. 7 THE COURT: the state practice on everything --8 MR. RICHARDS: Correct. 9 THE COURT: -- is you don't generally proceed by 10 11 Indictment; you proceed by -- you have a preliminary hearing. MR. RICHARDS: Right, unless the DA doesn't want a 12 preliminary hearing, then they'll go through the trouble of an 13 Indictment. But typically it's a preliminary hearing. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. RICHARDS: So what I'm saying is that on these 16 medical marijuana cases, I've never had an Indictment. 17 So 18 typically you would -- your client would produce the 19 recommendation; and if the DA said, "I want a custodian of 20 records declaration, " you would just go to the doctor's office and have his assistant sign a COR or they could go online -- a 21 lot of them in San Francisco, L.A. counties have online 22 23 verification -- or the DA would just call the doctor's office and if the doctor wanted to release just the limited 24

information that, "Yes, this was a patient," or, "Yes, this was

25

my recommendation" because the patient is now showing it publicly, that's how it would work. And then that declaration would be admitted at the hearing.

It's not supposed to be -- what I'm trying to explain to the Court is these are -- when people go through the trouble of getting the recommendation from the physician, the criminal goal was not to make the patient now go through a lot of hula hoops to take advantage of a state immunity that was provided so they can legally cultivate marijuana because there -- in that time in 2012 there was no readily available marijuana. You either had to grow your own marijuana or you would have to buy it from a dispensary or get it from a collective.

And so what I'm saying is, is that when we looked to prepare for the hearing, what we envisioned is we would present the obvious evidence that, "Hey, there was a doctor. He's a real doctor. The people that are there all have medical recommendations that are going to far exceed the 320 plants," which we don't know if they're female --

THE COURT: I mean, we're now getting into --

MR. RICHARDS: Right.

THE COURT: We may disagree on what "strict compliance" means. So whatever may happen in state court when you're facing a state criminal charge is fine, but we're in federal court. This is an evidentiary hearing. There's

nothing special about the medical marijuana context. I have evidentiary hearings all the time in criminal cases about all sorts of different criminal activity. The federal rules are what I look to, not the state rules.

I understand we have a relation to the state law here because there is reference in the rider to -- in the medical marijuana circumstance, if you can show strict compliance, and that's what we're here to do; but the procedure, since Erie versus Tompkins, we use federal procedure in federal court and state procedure in state court.

And so to some extent, while state law is implicated in this, state procedural law you shouldn't rely on as the model for how we're going to do this.

MR. RICHARDS: I --

THE COURT: But let me ask -- maybe I can short-circuit this.

Does the Government have a problem with my receiving these declarations that the Defense has proffered to me?

MS. GILBERT: I think, Your Honor, we have always been of the opinion that the Federal Rules of Evidence do apply to this hearing; but I think what I discussed earlier with the Defense counsel is that, you know, I don't have precedent that says in this particular type of hearing, they apply. So that's an open legal question.

If the Court wants to take the declarations, we just would

acknowledge that we haven't had a chance to cross-examine any of these witnesses. They're all hearsay. We have raised some concerns with the credibility of these witnesses and with the statements that they've made, and that we just ask that you give it less weight because of those concerns we have.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. There is a provision in the federal rules that talk in terms of some preliminary proceedings not requiring -- or at least permitting some hearsay being submitted; and, in fact, we do it, as you know, well, at bail hearings and other hearings. So it's not unheard of that I would be taking some of this material in.

The long and short of it is, just so that you're not in suspense, if this is the clarification question you were asking, I will consider the declarations. I will take them into consideration and admit them, but I am going to admit them with the understanding, just as Ms. Gilbert has said, that these witnesses haven't been subject to cross-examination; and to the extent that she's pointing out some problems with those, I'll have the understanding that they weren't -- I'm not sure it's going to call the question one way or the other, but I will receive the declarations.

MR. PALAZZO: And, Your Honor, just for, again, clarification, that applies across the board. I mean, there are declarations that were submitted by the Government as well.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. PALAZZO: And within those very declarations, there are hearsay statements that are attributed to third parties.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PALAZZO: And, again, we weren't expecting to have to, you know, force the Government to have all those people come today and testify and then be subject to cross-examination if they were just going to rely on the declarations. And the Court would give -- you know, accord whatever weight it chose to apply.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PALAZZO: But we wanted to supply the declarations in an effort to try to abbreviate the hearing instead of making it some protracted all-day event and sort of get to the nub of the issue and address the Court's concerns and then make argument, you know, based upon the state law that's been presented as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RICHARDS: It's like an injunction, Your Honor.

Typically when you're deciding, you know, in a civil case a preliminary injunction, you get declarations all the time and from both parties.

And, you know, we're dealing with a seizure, you know, over five years ago, so we felt that you would consider all the Government's declarations and the hearsay in those and put it

all into the goulash and see if we made a showing. 1 We're not dealing with a criminal burden of proof. It's a 2 preponderance of evidence. 3 That's fine, and I think I've indicated 4 THE COURT: 5 I'm going to do that. 6 MR. RICHARDS: All right. THE COURT: You've submitted four declarations, I 7 believe. 8 MR. RICHARDS: 9 Yes. THE COURT: You've got Pisarski and Moore. I mean, 10 11 they're here. They could potentially testify. Ramrattan and Apodaca; right? 12 13 MR. RICHARDS: Right. **THE COURT:** So we're really talking about Ramrattan 14 15 and Apodaca because they are not here, and you don't anticipate 16 calling them; right? Those are the two. 17 MR. RICHARDS: We didn't -- we wanted to first rely on the fact that we have 320 plants and we believe that whatever 18 19 excess cannabis that was going to be yielded from those 320 20 plants, because we don't know if they were male or female or all usable, that the current recommendations for Pisarski, 21 22 Pamela Moore and Sonny Moore and Sakina Ramrattan, if 23 necessary, are enough. But we believe in that household they were allowed to 24 cultivate marijuana. We don't know what they were going to do 25

with it once it was harvested.

THE COURT: So you're now getting into the substance.

MR. RICHARDS: I'm not trying to get into the substance. I'm saying if you needed those other -- if the whole case came down to Sakina Ramrattan coming in here and saying, "That's my recommendation, et cetera, and I dealt with Mr. Pisarski," I would get her. That's not a problem. But I wasn't going to go cumulative because I felt there's two separate issues.

And whenever you want me to explain how I wanted to present my issues, I'll do it. I don't want to do it now if you don't want to hear it right now.

THE COURT: This is not, as you know, a process of my starting some hearing and then saying, "Oh, I'd like to see this. Will you bring this in?" This is the day for the hearing. You tell me what you think I need to know. I make the rulings I'm going to make. You rise or fall on today's hearing.

So I'll tell you one scenario that's not going to happen, is my saying, "Oh, I'd like to hear... Will you please go find this witness for me and bring them in."

You have the burden, I think, under a preponderance of the evidence. You submit what you think satisfies your burden and I decide whether or not you've satisfied it or not. That's what this is about. It's going to be done today, and then

we're going to move on one way or the other. That's the deal. 1 MR. RICHARDS: All right. 2 That's fine. THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. RICHARDS: I get it. That's fine. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. PALAZZO: We just didn't want to have to bring in 6 Dr. Eidelman, Dr. Bradley, and all these people. 7 THE COURT: I'm telling you, you're the guys who know 8 what you think satisfies your burden. I may disagree with you, 9 10 but it's for you to decide. It's not -- in other words, it's 11 not for you to say, "Okay. Here. We've got this much, Judge. Tell me whether or not -- would you like some more? We'll 12 come" -- that's not the way this works. 13 MR. PALAZZO: No, I understand, Your Honor. 14 Today is your time. You have made your 15 THE COURT: 16 legal assessment on what you think satisfies your burden, and 17 my job is to hear and look and read whatever you submit and 18 decide if I think you have satisfied the burden or not. MR. PALAZZO: And if the Court is entertaining what 19 20 we've submitted in terms of the declarations and the exhibits, 21 then we're good. 22 Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 23 MR. RICHARDS: MS. GILBERT: Two quick housekeeping things. 24 25 apologize for not doing this earlier.

First is that the Government may, as I said last night, 1 may call the two case agents on the case --2 THE COURT: Right. 3 MS. GILBERT: -- Police Officer Chance Landreneaux and 4 5 DEA Agent John Rasmussen. They are both sitting at counsel's table and I would ask that they be permitted to stay during the 6 course of the hearing. They're already familiar with the whole 7 case given their prior work on this matter. 8 MR. PALAZZO: Are you just going to be relying on the 9 declarations that have already been submitted by them? 10 11 MS. GILBERT: I will, but I brought them here to be able to testify live and put in a few photographs of the 12 13 search. So I may or may not do that depending on what you-all put forward in your case. 14 MR. PALAZZO: Okay. 15 16 THE COURT: Well, I mean, do you object and insist on 17 the rule against witnesses sitting in? MR. PALAZZO: Exclusion of witnesses, I understand, 18 I really don't have any heartburn about it. 19 Your Honor. 20 think their declarations have already been submitted and, you know, we know what they're going to say. 21 22 Okay. All right. THE COURT: 23 MS. GILBERT: Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. So who would like to commence for 24 THE COURT: the -- which of you or both or --25

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MR. PALAZZO: Well, I'll let Mr. Richards start --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. PALAZZO: -- and then I'll flesh out the issues
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     that I feel are relevant.
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              THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Richards.
                         (Pause in proceedings.)
 6
 7
              MR. PALAZZO: Again, Your Honor, just so -- in the
     interest of abbreviating the process and based upon the Court's
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     inclination to accept the declarations and the exhibits that
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     have been proffered to the Court for its entertainment in
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     consideration of the issue, we're going to rest on the -- on
     what's been submitted to the Court in lieu of presenting live
12
13
     testimony.
14
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
15
              MR. RICHARDS: And so we -- I presented an exhibit
16
     list.
17
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. RICHARDS: Okay. So it's Exhibits 100 through
18
     109.
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              THE COURT: All right. Well, let me, first, on the
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     exhibits -- I told you I will receive and consider the
22
     declarations. With respect to the exhibits, you have 100 to
     109.
23
          Ms. Gilbert, what's the Government's position with respect
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     to the admission of exhibits -- and you can take them in -- if
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they're --

MS. GILBERT: Sure, Your Honor. I think our main objection is that these are all hearsay and that no one is here to set a foundation to authenticate these records.

You know, for instance, the first two -- all the recommendations -- so that's Exhibit 100, proposed Exhibit 101, that's Exhibit 104, and that's Exhibit 108 -- we don't even have declarations from the doctors stating that they wrote these -- that they wrote these recommendations. These were just submitted as part of declarations from other people. So we object on hearsay grounds to those.

On Exhibit 102, Exhibit 103, and Exhibit 109, which regard the bank records, we object because these haven't been authenticated. We have no custodian-of-record information. We don't know if these were fabricated. I'm just saying that we have some evidentiary concerns with these given the fact that these were just introduced by the defendants. I don't have a declaration from Wells Fargo stating that these are accurate records, that they were made at the time.

And then regarding the cultivation agreement -- that's

Number 105 proposed by the Defense -- again, this is hearsay.

None of the individuals who signed those agreements but for

Defendant Pisarski are here. We've also raised concerns about
these agreements in our papers and whether or not they were
actually signed by the people who purported to sign them. So

we object on hearsay grounds primarily.

And, finally, on Exhibit 106, which is the Covelo sales permit, I am prepared, if the Defense has rested, to call a custodian of records from the California it's now called the Department of Tax and Fee Administration, formerly the California Board of Equalization. He's here and I actually have him ready to admit that.

So I would prefer that that be admitted by him who is the proper custodian of record, but it is the actual copy of the original document which was submitted by a declarant in this case.

MR. RICHARDS: Okay. First --

THE COURT: Mr. Richards.

MR. RICHARDS: First, Your Honor, all the declarations laid the foundation and authenticated these exhibits. It's incorrect for -- well, let's deal with the Wells Fargo records first.

They're my client's records. They're the actual bank statements. I provided these to the Government a very long time ago; and if they had evidentiary objections to the exhibits to the declarations, they should have filed objections or told me when I gave it to them a long time ago that, "Hey, you better have a COR affidavit, or" -- but I believe Mr. Pisarski can lay the foundation for his own bank records. They're his records. He did the math.

It's just simply being offered to show that he took cash withdrawals from his records. So that's in his declaration. I don't see how you can receive the declaration but take out the exhibits because each declaration has the exhibits.

The Sakina Ramrattan declaration, her photograph and driver's license are on the recommendation, and she signs the declaration stating that it's her recommendation. Mr. Pisarski signs his that that's Mr. Eidelman's.

I cited case law for you in the brief which shows that the defendant can testify they have a recommendation and it's their recommendation. They don't need the doctor to get a declaration. That just never occurs. You don't have to go to a doctor and say, "Now I need you to write a separate declaration."

But I would just ask the Court to receive them and give it the weight that it deserves. But that's what I was saying. If the Court -- if there's a legitimate contention that Dr. Eidelman didn't sign it, then I would just ask the Court to -- I'll drive to his office in Hollywood when I get back today, and I'll have him sign a custodian of records affidavit.

I mean, I know who Dr. Eidelman is. He's been around for 20 years. I think in 1996 when I wrote the first article on Proposition 215 for a Los Angeles lawyer, Dr. Eidelman opened up his practice and started giving recommendations.

Okay. And so the issue is simply -- I mean, if there's a

doubt as to these, the Government should have told us, you 1 know, that "I have some doubts." 2 THE COURT: Let me ask Ms. Gilbert. 3 MS. GILBERT: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: Are you -- are any of your objections 6 relevance objections, or are all these all authentication, foundation, hearsay? 7 MS. GILBERT: I think we object to the relevance, and 8 I think our brief states this, to the Wells Fargo Bank records. 9 Our view is that even if he did withdraw all of that cash, it's 10 11 irrelevant to proving whether or not he was making a profit or not with the marijuana business. 12 So I think the -- those are relevance objections. 13 THE COURT: Although, that objection is more -- in my 14 mind, it doesn't -- it doesn't go the distance to prove what 15 they're trying to prove. 16 17 I'm not sure it would be irrelevant. I mean, it could theoretically if you then combined it with some other showing. 18 It might be the sort of information that goes to the question. 19 You just are arguing by itself it's not enough. It's just --20 MS. GILBERT: No, Your Honor, that's correct. 21 22 Actually, that's a very good point. No, I think that's right. 23 I think if -- so, you know, I think we agree that they're relevant to -- the remainder particularly are -- certainly 24 relevant to the case here. 25

We have -- I am very concerned, I'll be honest with you, about admitting the cultivation agreements themselves. That is my biggest concern, because we have raised serious questions about whether these individuals actually signed the agreement in our brief.

THE COURT: This is Exhibit 105?

MS. GILBERT: This is 105, exactly.

MR. RICHARDS: Which individual are you referring to?

Because that wasn't in your papers. You didn't present those declarations.

MS. GILBERT: It was -- in our papers we noted that Laura Labelle had been interviewed by Officer Chance Landreneaux, and that was in Mr. Landreneaux's declaration.

Now, I understand, you know, that would be hearsay for him to testify to that; but Ms. Labelle is not here to state whether or not she actually signed that agreement, and we have evidence that shows she may not have signed that agreement.

And so, you know, I think that's a witness, for example, that I would very much like to have been able to cross-examine to determine whether or not she actually signed that agreement, and particularly because that agreement states that

Mr. Pisarski is her primary caregiver. The information that she told an officer in 2015 was that she had never met him and he wasn't her primary caregiver.

THE COURT: What is your foundational showing on 105?

I mean, what does --1 MR. RICHARDS: Well, Sakina Ramrattan testified in her 2 declaration that's her signature, and I don't -- we don't care 3 about Laura Labelle. I mean, you know, when DEA comes to your 4 5 house and says, "We want to talk to you about marijuana," it 6 doesn't shock me that someone may get nervous. 7 But we don't need Laura Labelle's grower agreement to prove what we need to prove here, so I --8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So are you --MR. PALAZZO: We'll forego that one. 10 11 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, we'll forego that. THE COURT: You'll forego that one. 12 MR. RICHARDS: And then we'll save time. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So 105 is just Ms. Ramrattan's 14 15 agreement, or is it --16 MR. RICHARDS: All of them. We can withdraw the Laura 17 Labelle portion of that. 18 MS. GILBERT: I would ask that they also withdraw the 19 Joseph Augustine portion as well because -- so they put in --20 they attached to Ms. Ramrattan's declaration three cultivation 21 agreements: One by Ms. Ramrattan herself and two by additional 22 people. 23 THE COURT: Okay. MS. GILBERT: So even if the Court allowed the 24 25 Ramrattan cultivation agreement based on the fact she at least

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filed a declaration stating "That's my signature," we have
 1
     nothing in the records, even the declarations from
 2
    Mr. Augustine or Ms. Labelle, and we actually -- and we
 3
     produced this information to the defendants. We tried to track
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 5
     down Ms. Labelle and Mr. Augustine.
          We were able to track down Mr. Augustine. He lives in
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 7
     Pennsylvania. And he stated that although he had signed that
     agreement, he had never met Mr. Pisarski and Mr. Pisarski was
 8
    never his caregiver, which makes me very concerned about the
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10
     legitimacy of that agreement given that Mr. Pisarski has signed
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     that agreement indicating that he's Mr. Augustine's caregiver.
              THE COURT: So these are all -- just so that I'm
12
13
     following all this, these three are part of the Ramrattan
     collective, which is the more informal of the two --
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              MR. RICHARDS: Correct.
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16
              THE COURT: -- collectives?
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              MS. GILBERT: Correct, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: So I'll go ahead and receive
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    Ms. Ramrattan's agreement.
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          With respect to Ms. Labelle, you're saying, "Okay.
21
     don't need to receive that."
22
              MR. RICHARDS: Augustine's different. Let me tell you
23
    why.
          He -- they went and found Mr. Augustine. He said, "That's
24
25
     my signature." My client never dealt with Mr. Augustine.
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dealt with Ramrattan. That's who the liaison was. That's what she said in his [sic] declaration. That's what he said. We're not suggesting that you need to actually know each other.

And we believe that Mr. Augustine signed it. If he doesn't remember signing it now -- he acknowledged he signed it and there's no evidence from the -- the Government knows he signed it.

THE COURT: You see, we're now -- we are -- for purposes of doing this according to some rules, we're way down the page here because we've got several links in the chain that are not here.

No one -- let's assume -- I'm perfectly willing to assume that this gentleman signed that agreement, but we've now got some issues that Ms. Gilbert is suggesting apply as to what that really means, and we don't have Mr. Augustine here nor do we have a declaration from Mr. Augustine. So I don't know any of these issues.

Now, but I'm not -- I don't want to get too bogged down because I don't think this is the central question.

I will receive the Ramrattan agreement, and then we're not going to receive -- so we're modifying 105 to be the Ramrattan agreement, and then the Augustine and the Labelle agreements

I'm not going to receive.

Okay. They will not be admitted. Okay?

MR. PALAZZO: Okay.

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1
              THE COURT:
                          Next.
              MR. RICHARDS: All right.
 2
              MR. PALAZZO: Any other issues with the exhibits?
 3
              MS. GILBERT: I mean, I think we do still have issues
 4
 5
     with the recommendations; but I will say this, Your Honor --
 6
              THE COURT:
                          They go to the weight and I will admit
     that.
 7
              MR. PALAZZO: Perfect.
 8
              MS. GILBERT: Agreed.
 9
              THE COURT: And let me just ask a question with
10
11
     respect to, you provided to me -- "you" being the Defense
     side -- I think this is -- 109 is more voluminous.
12
13
     the Wells Fargo records, but there was one page that you
     highlighted, I believe.
14
15
              MR. RICHARDS: Right. Yeah. I didn't want you to
16
    have to look through all the records. On the first page of the
17
     244 pages --
18
              THE COURT: Right.
              MR. RICHARDS: -- if you look at it, you have it in
19
20
     your hand, Your Honor, it's the top right --
21
              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. RICHARDS: -- that's the total cash withdrawals
22
23
     for that period, 799,000.
              THE COURT: So this page -- you're doing that to help
24
    me summarize, if you will. You're not suggesting this page has
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some particular significance?
 1
              MR. RICHARDS: Only that that's my client's
 2
     calculations --
 3
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
 4
 5
              MR. RICHARDS: -- and I didn't want you to have to add
 6
    up everything.
 7
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
                                 Thank you.
              MR. RICHARDS: That's the first page of the exhibit.
 8
              THE COURT: Very good. Okay.
 9
          So I will receive those exhibits with the understanding
10
11
     that there are some weight issues that Ms. Gilbert has
    highlighted for me. Okay?
12
          (Defense Exhibits 100 through 109 received in evidence)
13
              MR. PALAZZO: Thank you, Your Honor.
14
15
              MR. RICHARDS: Now, as far as my presentation, now
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     that we've got the evidence out of the way, can I just simply
17
     tell you, then, how you should view the evidence and then rest;
18
     or do you want --
19
              THE COURT:
                          You may.
20
                            Okay. Great.
              MR. RICHARDS:
21
          All right. So as the Court may or may not be aware, the
     issue in this case is what marijuana are we dealing with on
22
     July 10th, 2012. That's the only marijuana we're dealing with.
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          So the law --
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              THE COURT: You mean that's what's been charged in the
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1 Indictment.

MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. So we're not dealing with what happened before or after. We're dealing with that narrow day.

And marijuana in California has had a long, tortured history with respect to when Proposition 215 was first enacted in November of 1996, and then the legislature in 2003 issued some more extensive guidelines and laws.

THE COURT: MMA; right? Or MMPA. Excuse me.

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah.

So in 2012, as the Court saw from the citations, a flurry of Court of Appeal opinions started being generated in the various courts dealing with medical marijuana and various issues. And on that date when the Humboldt County sheriffs came to the location, there was -- they took the marijuana plants, the medical cannabis that was growing, and it's been destroyed to the best of my knowledge. So that was in July.

Typically the time when these things are fully bloomed is in October. So you don't know which -- how these plants are going to turn out. The fact that there's 320 plants doesn't mean you're going to get 320 plants of usable marijuana. There's male plants, female plants, plants get lost to mold. There's many different things that occur.

So at this moment in time you have 320 plants and you have a seizure. We never are going to know what happened to those

So the Government in their papers and all these other 1 plants. arguments is trying to expand this to what would have happened 2 if there was excess cannabis and where would this all have 3 4 gone. 5 So the question is: How do we want you to view this evidence? We want you to view the evidence that you had the 6 Moore recommendation for Pamela and Sonny. You had the 7 Pisarski recommendation. That is more than enough to cover any 8 marijuana that was going to be harvested. 9 10 So they're allowed to cultivate marijuana because at that 11 time, and the theory has always been, you have to grow your own marijuana. And that's why, you know, you saw the Jackson case 12 come out and then the Anderson case, all these state cases, 13 Baniani that we cited for you, because as the law was 14 15 developing, it became clear to the courts that you're never 16 going to have a normal situation because you can't go into a 17 bank, you can't have a storefront, and so you have to, 18 basically, pool your resources together. So you would need people like Mr. Pisarski who, 19 20 ironically, he, in the time period that he was doing this, he 21 paid over \$1.5 million in taxes. He had a successful --22 THE COURT: Let me stop you on that. He pays

THE COURT: Let me stop you on that. He pays
1.5 million in federal taxes.

MR. RICHARDS: Right.

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THE COURT: At least that's what you've told me.

1 MR. RICHARDS: That's what he testified, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But one of the aspects of compliance in this case is paying state sales taxes. Where is the evidence that he paid state sales tax?

MR. RICHARDS: Okay. That is absolutely inaccurate.

I don't know why the Government -- that is just wrong. The fact is, is that there has never been a California case that I've ever heard of or been involved in where a defendant lost their immunity because they didn't pay sales tax on marijuana sales, but that's a red herring because there were no sales in this case. The marijuana that was seized was never sold.

THE COURT: No, no, but the question is whether or not this -- I understand your point that the particular marijuana that's the focus of the case is what's seized and charged.

That's fine. But the course of business is relevant.

So if this -- if you don't have evidence that shows that the defendants scrupulously followed all the requirements to provide medical marijuana consistent with state law, you've got a problem even if on that particular day and time there was, as you suggest, we don't know exactly how many plants were ultimately going to come to fruition and all of that. On that day I need to have some evidence that you had jumped through all the necessary hoops -- "you" being your clients -- to provide medical marijuana.

MR. RICHARDS: No, Your Honor, respectfully, the

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Government is steering you into a dispensary analysis.
 1
                                                             This is
     the nuance that is being missed in the papers. This is a
 2
     grower that has a house --
 3
                          Right.
 4
              THE COURT:
 5
              MR. RICHARDS: -- that makes up a -- he has 410 acres.
 6
     The greenhouse takes up 1 percent of that, a 15-minute walk
     from the house.
 7
                     So --
              THE COURT: But the rider is not -- on which you're
 8
     relying is not limited to a dispensary.
 9
10
              MR. RICHARDS: You're right.
11
              THE COURT: The rider is anybody who is involved in
     this business, effectively.
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              MR. RICHARDS: No, no, no. The rider protects
    patients to grow their own marijuana.
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              THE COURT: Correct. Well, I don't think that's
16
     correct.
17
              MR. RICHARDS: This is the disconnect: The Government
     is creating regulations that don't apply to what's going on
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19
            I'm just -- let me just --
20
              THE COURT: Well, is it your position that growers
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    have -- they're just unconstrained by any regulation?
                                                            That
22
     only the dispensary has regulations that they have to comply
    with under state law?
23
              MR. RICHARDS: A grower -- a grower who has a doctor's
24
    note and is living in a home with two other people that have
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doctors' notes, they can grow as much marijuana as their
medical needs require, and they're allowed -- because they
cannot buy it in the store. There's only one growing season a
year they can grow it.

THE COURT: But they can't sell it into the marketplace.

MR. RICHARDS: There is no evidence they sold it into the marketplace, you're right.

THE COURT: I'm not asking for what they can and cannot do in the abstract.

MR. RICHARDS: No, they can't. They can deliver it to a collective that then is closed circuit and distributes it to their other members. They're entitled to get compensated for labor, for soil, and for their expenses. That's what they're entitled to do. They get an immunity under 11362.775. It gives them the full immunity against possession for sale.

But that's not the case we have here. The Government -look, I am confident this prosecutor has never prosecuted a
state marijuana case in her career.

Is that a fair statement?

Okay. So, I mean, that's not the law. This is not a storefront where patients are coming in off the street, they're registering, and then they're distributing marijuana. That's a strict analysis because the police send in undercovers all the time. There's city licenses. There's whole city regulations

1 in L.A., Orange County, and San Francisco.

The issue here is this is a country grower that owns a horticulture business that has bank accounts and tax returns, and makes plenty of money in his regular business. So in this time period he's deciding to grow some marijuana and if there's excess cannabis -- the only reason why I presented to you Ramrattan and Covelo is to show you that if there was excess cannabis, he had another patient that had an informal collective that he would unload it to if that option was available. We'll never know about this marijuana because it was seized.

So in this particular hearing, he only needs to show that he was legally allowed to grow marijuana, and the best evidence as to why it was legal is the Humboldt County sheriffs never charged him. It was never referred to the DA.

THE COURT: That doesn't mean anything.

MR. RICHARDS: Well, it means a lot to the extent that
if --

THE COURT: No, it doesn't. There are many people that don't get charged for all sorts of criminal conduct, and that's a function of the resources of law enforcement and other things. You can't prove the "I'm innocent because I -- you can take the fact that I was not charged by state authority to mean I am innocent of all criminal conduct." It doesn't work that way.

MR. RICHARDS: Okay. Well, I'm saying it's a factor that is interesting, that if there was some rampant violation of state law.

The issue is the cultivation of marijuana outside is not an easy process, and so in this particular case there's no history that Mr. Pisarski was successful in the marijuana cultivation industry. The year before -- you know, I could give you evidence -- there was mold. It's irrelevant because what's relevant is this marijuana.

So the analysis is narrow. Were they in compliance with state law as patient growers? Because the only way you can get marijuana is you grow your own marijuana in that time period five years ago.

THE COURT: Can I -- and this is jumping ahead to the Government's -- what the Government's going to present for me, but I might as well get your view of it now. Can I take any inference at all from the circumstances of how cash is found in this -- in where he's doing the growing, that they're -- you know, it's all -- cash is wrapped up and hidden and all of that? Can I -- are you suggesting I shouldn't make any inference at all with that?

MR. RICHARDS: You can make inference of it, but having wrapped-up cash does not mean that you're not allowed to have marijuana, I mean, and grow marijuana. And I will tell you -- and I've been doing these cases a very long time -- I

have never had a client in my whole career give me years of 1 bank statements and show me cash withdrawals from his own 2 Wells Fargo account totaling \$800,000. 3 THE COURT: I get --4 5 MR. RICHARDS: So that's a factor that evens out the cash, but it doesn't make --6 THE COURT: What does the cash withdrawal in your mind 7 mean? I'm not sure what -- okay. He's withdrawing money from 8 his Wells Fargo account. Why -- what am I to take from that? 9 I'm not sure. 10 MR. RICHARDS: That the cash at the residence was 11 That's cash from his withdrawals. And in that industry, 12 13 Your Honor, they want to -- that time especially you cannot 14 open up a bank account. 15 THE COURT: I understand that. 16 MR. RICHARDS: So everybody would buy and sell in cash 17 not because it was nefarious. The federal government wouldn't 18 give you a tax deduction. There was no credit cards. 19 Dispensaries would receive money in cash and pay in cash. 20 if there was ever excess cannabis, that's how this was dealt. But what I don't think you can consider is just the fact 21

Because I'll tell you to be intellectually upfront with

even if, hypothetically, that three years ago he illegally sold

that it's -- the cash doesn't invalidate the recommendation

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marijuana.

you, many times in 2008, 2009 a client would be illegally selling marijuana -- okay? -- or maybe even going back now to 2003 because I want to focus when the legislature really put in some immunities, and I would tell clients, "What? Are you nuts? Why don't you do it legally? Get notes. Document what you're doing. Go to a real doctor like Eidelman where you can -- he's always available. Get someone that people know of that's been doing this a long time, that has a real license."

And so the thing is, is that -- is that it doesn't matter why he had cash because the issue is: Was he legal when they seized the plants? What are you charging him with under state law?

Now, I'm not arguing state procedure. We have to follow state law. If you have a -- if you have a recommendation that allows you to grow up to 100 plants, the police cannot question that recommendation. State law does not allow the DA to say, "I don't agree with the doctor's recommendation." That's not for the DA or the Government to do. The doctor's recommendation is the recommendation.

So in this case if we limit it to that day, we have three medical recommendations that provide compliance with 320 undeveloped plants. So I can't -- I just wanted to show the Court in our papers that there was another unrelated person who signed a declaration that said that he would grow for us and that they had a written agreement that established the

compensation, but it's not pertinent if you accept the fact that he was legal for just cultivating marijuana.

The only crime, by the way, that could have possibly been committed under state law on July 12th, 2010, is a violation of 11358 of the Health and Safety Code, cultivate -- illegal cultivation of marijuana. There was no evidence of him distributing. There was no undercover. There was no evidence of anything other than there was a growing and that there may have been evidence, if you look at the Government's cash in the worst possible light, that there may have been evidence of past sales of something that resulted in cash receipts if you disregard the Wells Fargo Bank records. But what does that mean? How does that invalidate the doctor's recommendation? It just doesn't.

And so the way the courts have evolved in the cases that we cited -- you know, London, Baniani, and Anderson -- all the patient has to do is say they have a recommendation and the burden then shifts to the Government.

Even on the preponderance of the evidence standard, they have to put on evidence that somehow he can't grow -- and I wasn't trying to be funny when I said a measly 300 plants. It is measly when the DA, if he takes the stand, he knows there was people growing 10,000 plants just next-door. That's a commercial operation.

You know, this would never be brought today, a 300-plant

case. That is a very small number of marijuana plants that are undeveloped. And so we don't think that we're required under a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove more than what we've already proven.

I mean, it's a rural house. He's out very far away. I think 30 minutes from any store. I mean, it's far away. It's not like there's any -- it's a nonurban area. It's on 410 acres. And he explained in his declaration that he had no alarm on the greenhouse. He couldn't hear anything going off. It was far from the house. I mean, this was just someone -- a lot of people in that area grow marijuana. I mean, they just do. And he was -- they were growing marijuana for their use.

And whether -- the Government wants the Court to keep thinking this is like Neiman Marcus or some 7-Eleven. It's not. He's just a grower. And once a grower brings the product to the dispensary -- that's why I presented the transport agreement -- typically how it works is the grower will go to the dispensary. The burden where the microscope falls is on who's selling it to the end user, to the street person, to the patient, not -- the law is very elastic and liberal for the grower because there would be no source of supply. So the legislature set up very strong protection to growers and they have full immunity as long as they're bringing the marijuana to a collective.

So I would agree if the Government saw Mr. Pisarski drive

to the street and meet some guy that was an undercover working for the DEA and he didn't check that he was a member of a collective and he sold and then they arrested him, I wouldn't be making that argument. He's outside the protection. But you can't prosecute him and find that the protection doesn't apply for conduct that hasn't occurred yet. That's Minority Report, the movie. I mean, we don't have that here. And so that's the issue.

And all the things with the photos and the firearm and everything, that's just to have you get distorted and say, "Oh, this guy is dealing dope because he has the cash and there was a weapon." That has nothing to do with whether he's allowed to grow marijuana for medicinal purposes in the state of California.

I mean, that policy has become so strong that in November of last year, they defelonized all of marijuana and under certain amounts it's completely legal, but you can have a billion pounds of marijuana now in California and it's no more than a misdemeanor. Can you believe it? I mean --

THE COURT: You know, I totally understand the context in which this is arising. I'm a resident of the state of California and vote in the elections. But, you know, we are -- we have to struggle here; and it's not of my making or your making that we have the federal system overlaying the state system, and it's not an optimal statutory scheme.

I mean, as the McIntosh case says when they're talking 1 about the rider, they're suggesting that maybe it wasn't the 2 masterpiece of statutory construction. I understand what you 3 say of the realities of where we are here, and it doesn't 4 5 offend me at all. That's where we are. But the fact is that doesn't answer this case. I have 6 7 to -- I have to apply this what I think is a fairly narrow rider to the state of the federal law, which still criminalizes 8 this conduct. Even as you say, it may be that it's de -- and 9 you're right, it's effectively defelonized in our state under 10 11 the state's law, but painfully -- it's painfully true, and you know it as well as I do, the state of California doesn't 12 control the federal prosecution. 13 MR. RICHARDS: Right. Let's talk about the State 14 15 Board of Equalization. If you're growing your own marijuana, that's not a taxable event. 16 17 THE COURT: Well, let's go back to 2012 and medicinal marijuana. 18 MR. RICHARDS: Right. 19 THE COURT: And let's not talk about today --20 MR. RICHARDS: I'm not. 21 22 THE COURT: -- because it doesn't help this analysis.

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MR. RICHARDS: In 2012, you didn't need to have a State Board of Equalization number to grow marijuana in your home. It's not required. It's only required if there's an

event that triggers a sales tax, but that's a sales tax violation. It doesn't -- the schemes are separate. The Revenue and Taxation Code, if you violate it, it's a misdemeanor.

THE COURT: But isn't it -- but when you're talking about the rider, doesn't that mean that you're not strictly complying? Even if it's, under your characterization, a fairly minimal problem under state law, if you haven't jumped through all the hoops under state law, you are then not strictly complying because then you don't get the benefit of the rider.

MR. RICHARDS: No, that's a mistake, and I'll tell you why it's a mistake. The rider has -- the rider doesn't address sales tax. State law, if you look at the MMPA, has nothing to do with sales tax. It doesn't mention sales tax at all.

The guidelines -- the ancient Jerry Brown guidelines that were written in 2010, which doesn't take into account all the Court of Appeal cases that came out, they just say that the state is going to charge sales tax on marijuana sales. That's great for the state, but that doesn't make the possession of marijuana with a medical recommendation illegal if you don't have a sales tax number.

The state wants sales tax, but there's never -- there's not one case that you'll ever read that the court says if they don't have a sales tax number, they lose the immunity or they're divested of the immunity to transport marijuana to a

collective or to provide excess cannabis. 1 In fact, there's no sale because they're only being 2 reimbursed for the labor, the materials, to actually bring it 3 to the collective. The sale occurs at the collective or the 4 dispensary. That's the taxable event. There's not two taxable 5 That's the confusion here. It's the grower is growing 6 events. an agricultural product so that product is given to somebody 7 who then is going to sell it and collect the sales tax. 8 But even if the --9 THE COURT: What is the relationship of your client to 10 these collectives? 11 MR. RICHARDS: He's a grower member of the collective. 12 THE COURT: A grower member. Okay. 13 14 MR. RICHARDS: Right. 15 THE COURT: So when the collective then sells to the 16 dispensary --17 MR. RICHARDS: Correct. THE COURT: -- okay, he's part of that? He's not 18 19 just -- he doesn't grow, sell to the collective, and the 20 collective then sells to the dispensary. He's part of the 21 collective, is he? The defendant? 22 MR. RICHARDS: THE COURT: Correct. 23 MR. RICHARDS: He's a member of the collective. 24

there's excess cannabis, I was only trying to show you that

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there was people he knew that had informal collectives and a formal collective that would then assist in getting that marijuana, if there was excess, to a responsible person that was allowed to have it.

The Government is saying, "Well, we don't know who that was going to go to." Either do I because it never happened.

So I'm not going to -- if it did happen, if he brought it to an irresponsible or un -- a party that couldn't enjoy the immunity, then we would have a problem, but that never occurred and we don't have to engage in what would have happened.

And so he's a member. Typically the growers are members of the collective and they get an agreement so if they're stopped by the police and they have, you know, 25 pounds of medical cannabis, they tell the police, "I'm going to this collective"; and the collective, who hopefully has their licenses in order, will say, "Yes, he's bringing us our medicinal marijuana." That's the whole point of that relationship.

But in this case that's not a relationship you need to examine because he was growing in the first instance for himself, his co-owner of the property, and that person's mother, Pamela Moore. That's the only people we're dealing with at this point, and we have enough from those recommendations.

And so I just didn't want you to think -- I was trying to

be explanatory that this Sakina Ramrattan, she had a note up to 100 pounds. She would explain that she couldn't grow it all in her house, that he would provide the excess cannabis. But that's not a taxable event. If Mr. Pisarski gives marijuana to Mr. Moore, that's not a taxable event.

But, hey, look, the IRS, the FTB, the State Board of Equalization, they like to say a lot of things could be a taxable event but that's litigated in Tax Court. That doesn't have anything to do with criminal immunities. This is a completely separate playground and basket, and it's just indicia.

What the guideline is saying is -- what the Government is saying is, hey, if this is all strict compliance, then he would -- he would -- the Attorney General recommended that you get a resale number, but the Attorney General's guidelines are not law. That's the problem with this analysis. The law is 11362.775, and there is no requirement of getting a business license, a tax license, because a lot of this stuff is done informally and on small scales because if it gets to over 1,000 plants, you have federal mandatory minimums and other problems.

So the general gestalt of people that were growing low amounts of marijuana for medicinal purposes in that time period wanted to stay under the federal radar. This is the unusual, very unusual case that a 300-plant case would end up in federal court. That's unusual, very, and so that's why PSR --

Probation told me they haven't seen a case for many years with this type of marijuana, you know. And that's why this case should only be looked at the facts of this case and not looked at what was going to happen prospectively.

And he's not -- anybody in the state of California that grows medical marijuana, there is no -- you are provided no evidence in the brief that the legislature enacted a law that says you have to have a resale number in your own home. I mean, it's just not there.

And those guidelines were enacted at a time before the courts got involved. After the courts, you had Jackson,

Anderson, all these other great opinions. Those guidelines are superfluous at this point. I mean, that's another unfair thing to the defendant. Those guidelines were 2010. This occurred in 2012. We're in 2017. The law is so much better for defendants, and I think that you wouldn't --

THE COURT: It may be.

MR. RICHARDS: But you wouldn't disagree that we don't apply the case law in 2012. We at least apply the current case law -- case law, I'm not talking about procedure -- but case law and how it's interpreted the 2003 immunities. It's an evolving statute. The courts weren't -- a court can't get a case for a couple years, a Court of Appeal, so those are all binding.

If you apply all those cases, you'd see it's a low

threshold. The defendant says he has a note. The note -- the note authorizes a certain amount of marijuana. We are so below what could have possibly been yielded from that residence that there's nothing more we need to present to you unless the Government can prove that we haven't met this burden that somehow this note didn't exist, we're not allowed to grow any marijuana. I mean, all this other stuff about the collectives and taxes and the Covelo resale number got canceled, all this other stuff is irrelevant because I just wanted -- I was giving it to you for corroboration.

THE COURT: But if I sort of hear what you're saying --

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- effectively you're saying that in 2012, your client was a grower and there really were no regulations that pertained to him. There's no constraints upon -- as long as there's some -- he can show that there were some patients or primary caregivers that were looking to purchase marijuana and he can show that they're out there, that's all he needs to do.

MR. RICHARDS: If he's -- that's a great statement, but I want to just add another sentence. If he got charged with transportation, he'd have to show he's bringing it to a collective. If he -- primary caregiver is not the same as growing for a collective. That's a very important nuance.

THE COURT: My point that I'm trying to hone in on

Effectively you're saying that when the McIntosh case 1 here is: says -- and that is, by the way, whatever else is said here, I 2 have to follow the McIntosh case. 3 MR. RICHARDS: Right. 4 THE COURT: It is the Ninth Circuit's edict. 5 MR. RICHARDS: We agree. 6 THE COURT: You like it, you don't like it, it doesn't 7 I have to follow it. matter. 8 And so when they say I must determine whether or not there 9 has been strict compliance, and the way they say it in here is 10 11 whether or not the conduct was completely authorized by state law, by which we mean that they strictly complied with all 12 relevant conditions imposed by state law on the use, 13 distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana. 14 15 And if I'm hearing you correctly, you're saying, well, 16 your clients really had no particular state law requirements. 17 They were growing this. As long as they're growing a 18 sufficiently small amount, that you can account for how it 19 would ultimately go to someone who is a patient or primary 20 caregiver or themselves, end of story. 21 MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. There was no --22 THE COURT: Okay. I just want to know if that's your 23 understanding. MR. RICHARDS: There was no bureau of growers at that 24

time and there's none today. The growers have been given, I

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would say, the most liberal amount of the protection of the immunity.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. I want to make sure I understand your argument.

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. Because without the growers, there is no medical cannabis. You need the growers. And then the growers aren't having contact with people lining up in a city to buy marijuana. That's more risky, there's more risk of other problems, and so that's where different regulations are concerned.

But there is strict compliance with their law because the only law that they were complying with is that if they were going to go outside -- the only facts in this case that we agree to that I don't think there's a quarrel is, that the only criminal act, absent the immunity that everybody was looking at, was there was cultivation of undeveloped plants. That's an undisputed fact.

There was no other evidence in this Indictment of -- that those plants had done anything but been taken out of the ground from the roots that they were in. That's all that happened.

So if the police showed up, which they did, and the only thing the grower would need to show that they have strict compliance is they would have to show for sure a medical marijuana recommendation that would cover those plants, which we have more than enough to cover, or something from a

collective in the residence that shows that they were growing that medical cannabis for a specific collective and it was authorized and that's where they were going to transport it to.

And here we have the fact that they were allowed to grow it for themselves, and it's only the excess cannabis. The Government shouldn't worry about the cannabis they were going to keep. If there was excess cannabis, this is not a hard burden to show where that would have went, but we don't want to go there, that's the problem, because we don't know what would have been had they not seized it. And so that's why I think on that limited lens we've met the burden.

We don't pick the facts, so that's the facts in this case. When they indicted this case, the agents never thought that on July 28th, 2017, I would be able to assert an immunity under 11362.775. That was never contemplated by this investigation because the law in July of 2012 was: The state is getting very good for growers. Let's send the case federal.

That's why the case went federal because the laws -- these defenses weren't allowed in federal court. Now you've been thrown this total loop where now you have to sit as a state court judge and say, "Is this strict compliance? What's the -- how is the grower not in compliance to grow their own marijuana if I accept the fact that they had a valid recommendation and I don't know what these plants would have yielded if they became fully matured and which ones were female, which ones were

male?" I have no idea. I don't know if they were ever -- the crop was ever going to make it to fruition. There's many things that can harm an outdoor crop.

So that's really the issue that you're dealing with, and I think that because of those facts, <code>McIntosh</code> applies to them because why are we prosecuting someone like this? There's no -- this Indictment is only charging them with cultivation. I mean, that's the crime that was occurred. There's no -- this is not a case where there's wiretaps or Pisarski has been selling it, you know, all over the place. This is a localized residential, you know, marijuana grow for a guy that lives, you know, in an isolated part of California. That's all this is.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. Mr. Palazzo, anything you want to add?

MR. PALAZZO: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

And, again, I'm going to try to keep my comments brief, and I really want to hone in and more narrowly address what I think is the issue in the case.

I trust that the Court did receive my reply and the attachments.

THE COURT: I did.

MR. PALAZZO: And I think within that, you know, I sort of direct the Court as to what the real issue is, and I think that the Court actually harkened to the issue in the order, which is: On July 10th, 2012, were the defendants in

strict compliance with California law so that they are deserving of the *McIntosh* protections that the decision provided?

And in this case I think that, again, if you're looking at the state law, the elements that provide limited immunity are outlined as basically four. Is the patient -- does the patient have a recommendation, or is he a primary caregiver? And did he possess or cultivate marijuana? And was it done for personal medical purposes? And did the patient do so based upon the recommendation or approval of a physician? Those are the four elements that provide limited immunity under the Compassionate Use Act.

Then if you shift to the Medical Marijuana Program Act, that's where you get into the issue of the collective. And what the case law discusses is, when this is kind of addressing some of the points that the Court was raising in terms of what regulations apply, the case law that's been cited is -- speaks to the issue of a collective if there are a few members that are growing for each other and for their medical purposes, and then it also discusses if you have a collective that is much more expansive.

And if you look at the case that addresses the distinction and then what regulations, to use the court's verbiage, apply, it's kind of outlined in the *Orlosky* case, which is a 2015 case that's been cited.

And within that particular case, they discuss if you're -first of all, they say in the Medical Marijuana Program Act
under -- that's been codified in Health and Safety Code,
Section 11362.775, that it does allow for a collective
cultivation; and there's no mention made, as the court
instructs, of any formality requirements. There's no mention
made of permissible number of persons. There's no mention made
of acceptable financial arrangements that are required. And
there's also a fourth item mentioned by the court in that
decision where there is no mention made of distribution
limitations within the MMPA.

They do also address in that decision that the business formality criteria have been only applied in cases involving expansive marijuana distribution operations to persons outside of cultivation activities. So if you get into something that's much more expansive, then I think the regulations that the court was describing kick in.

In this particular case, based upon the declarations and the exhibits that have been proffered to the Court, we meet the elements that I discussed at the outset, the four elements that provide limited immunity, because you've got three people that have provided recommendations to the Court. And there's also mention made that the amounts can be reasonable for the uses that the person has for medical marijuana.

So there's no -- the case law speaks to the issue of not

having even limitations under the *Kelly* case, which states that limitation may not be used to burden the reasonable medical needs authorized under the Compassionate Use Act. And so the amount reasonably related to the patient's medical needs is what's permitted under the *Kelly* decision. Again, that's also cited within the moving papers.

And then, lastly, there's also a case of -- that I cited which had an odd name to it. It was, like, Camerottin (phonetic) -- or, no. There was a case cited within that case, which was People versus Windus, W-I-N-D-U-S, and it's a 2008 case and it states that the Compassionate Use Act does not require that a physician specify the amount of marijuana needed to address a defendant's needs. So that's -- and, again, as I mentioned, that's a 2008 case and the cite is 165 Cal.App. 4th 634.

So looking at the facts of this case and trying to address the Court's issue regarding whether or not strict compliance of state law was indeed had as it relates to use, distribution, possession, cultivation, as cited by the court from the <code>McIntosh</code> decision, you have people that are growing for their own needs; and you can also construe that as an informal collective as permitted in the <code>Orlosky</code> case where they don't require formalities. It speaks to that very issue where it was defendant and a roommate had not formed a marijuana collective with some indicia of formality, but the collective cultivation

defense allows qualified patients to associate to collectively cultivate marijuana for medical purposes.

So that is an extension. That case law stemming from the MMPA and the statutory scheme that evolved from that legislation allows people to, not only three people such as we have here, to collect -- to have their own informal collective, but it also allows the distribution of marijuana to a collective such as Ms. Ramrattan's collective that she described in her declaration.

So I think that's what was being addressed by

Mr. Richards, that looking at this in the more narrow scope and
in its isolation, you have compliance with state law by virtue
of three people with three recommendations growing their own
marijuana for medical purposes for their own needs on the
property.

Now, whether or not from that particular grow on July 10th, 2012, there was going to be something that would be provided beyond the medical needs, because that was something that you couldn't really forecast until you actually harvest and you see, hey, how many flowers are on each of these plants. We know the male plants don't produce, so you're looking at only female plants. And then you're looking at the female plants that actually survive that outdoor process and what you're able to harvest in terms of the flowers and then turn into buds.

And then you've got to wonder whether or not -- okay, what's the concentration of the THC within that particular bud, that medical cannabis that you're going to consume or ingest? How are you going to ingest it? Are you going to smoke it? Are you going to create an edible that you're going to use to ingest it in that fashion?

So there are a lot of variables that are not known until the actual date of harvesting as to whether or not that is going to satisfy the medical needs of the three people such as we have here.

THE COURT: So you're essentially telling me that if you have a -- let's say in 2012 you have a grow operation and you have some -- you can -- you have documentation that indicates at least some medically appropriate users out there waiting to receive -- either the growers themselves or some others that have a medical justification for receiving the marijuana. Once you have that, it doesn't matter. You're in compliance with state law. You can have a gigantic operation, you can have a small operation; but because one doesn't know how at that moment in time all this marijuana will either come to fruition or how it will be used, it doesn't matter. You've got -- it's almost as if you've got this jumping-off point of some justification -- or some, you know, legally appropriate use of some marijuana. That's all you need under state law.

MR. PALAZZO: No. Let me just clarify. I understand

1 where the Court is going with that.

If this were a grow, for instance, and there were 5,000 plants and you had Pamela Moore, Sonny Moore, and Tony Pisarski --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PALAZZO: -- then I think the Court can say, "Wait a second. That's not a reasonable amount that we would expect for medical purposes for these three people." Okay?

So that's the distinction here. And --

THE COURT: So do I have to conclude that, well, within reason, the 371, or however many plants, okay, I assume that there would be use by the growers themselves for medical; and the other people that you mentioned, am I supposed to do some calculation on whether or not that's a reasonable amount for those people?

MR. PALAZZO: Well, I don't think you need to do a calculation, Your Honor; but if you look at, for instance -- this is, I think, how we sort of get to the issue of is it reasonable, and it kind of gives the Court a little bit of a guideline as well.

If you look, for instance, at the document that was furnished to the Court, which is Document 176-8 filed on July 10th, 2017, by Mr. Richards on behalf of Mr. Pisarski, on that particular document it says Mr. Pisarski may grow up to 99 plants and possess up to 6 pounds of dried cannabis flowers for

his own personal medical use.

So sometimes you have recommendations that will have a specific number like that, like 99 plants, and sometimes you don't. And so you have to, you know, again be reasonable and apply a reasonable standard.

If we determine, hey, this recommendation says 99 plants and maybe you have another recommendation that doesn't confine it to 99 plants -- again, a reasonable amount -- I think you can extrapolate from that and say: Okay. We've got three people on that property. Sonny is a primary caregiver for his mother. Tony Pisarski is, in a sense, a co-primary caregiver for Pamela Moore. So even in her own right in terms of the recommendation that she had personally, she could have been a participant in the grow.

But as an overlay, you have the protection of the primary caregiver where the declarations speak to the issue of, "Hey, I was providing and we were providing a residence for my mother and providing for her health, safety, and welfare."

And so if you look at the reasonableness standard, I think that kind of gives you the guideline that the Court might be expecting to see and say whether or not this is compliant, and that's outlined in that exhibit where there's 99 plants. So you multiply that by three people, you're at the 297 plants of the 320 that we had here. And, again, you have a certain amount of attrition that occurs just through the growing

process and as a function of whether you've got male or female and how much they flower and the other factors that I mentioned and variables that I mentioned.

So that --

THE COURT: Can I shift you for a moment? And this is something I didn't talk about with Mr. Richards, but with one of you or both of you I want to talk to you about it, and that is the admissions in the Plea Agreement. What do I make of that?

MR. PALAZZO: They're consistent.

THE COURT: Well, I have it in front of me and I know there are two or three places. There's a forfeiture section, which we can talk about in a moment; but during that period, according to the language of the agreement (reading):

"I knowingly grew and possessed marijuana on this property and I did so with the intention to sell marijuana to others" -- so it's not just for personal use. He's admitting -- both defendants are admitting that they're planning to sell it -- "and I joined in the agreement knowing of its purpose and intending to accomplish that purpose."

And then it talks about the amount.

MR. PALAZZO: Yeah.

THE COURT: I mean, you said that's consistent, so tell me why it's consistent.

MR. PALAZZO: It's consistent. Here's why it's consistent, Your Honor. As was discussed, if, in fact, there was excess, you are permitted under state law and under case law that addresses and interprets that law to sell that marijuana to the collective -- for instance, Ms. Ramrattan's collective -- and you're able to, under the case of -- under the case of the -- of I believe it's the London case, People versus London, a 2014 case, 228 Cal.App. 4th 544, states that the monetary reimbursement that a collective or co-op member provides should be only an amount necessary to cover overhead costs and operating expenses.

So you can, indeed, and I think Ms. Ramrattan's declaration speaks to the issue of providing remuneration that was way below what the retail or wholesale value of the actual marijuana was. Again -- and that's probably why there was maybe some pay -- I think they characterize them as pay-owe sheets. Not pay-owe sheets relating to marijuana; pay-owe sheets as it relates to construction costs. That's what's in the record, not anything other than that. I want to make that clear.

MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, on the issue of the Plea Agreement, so it's clear in the record, what their intent was to plead guilty to a federal crime is irrelevant when you're now resetting this and saying "Did they have immunity under state law and were they compliant?"

Factual admissions in a Plea Agreement are 1 THE COURT: admissions. So whether or not -- what they were intending to 2 do and why they were doing it doesn't really go to the question 3 of whether or not when you make a factual admission in a 4 5 Plea Agreement, you can't just say, "I'm not -- I didn't mean it." 6 7 MR. RICHARDS: No, no. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the admissions there that they said they were 8 going to sell it -- okay, they didn't say they were going to 9 10 illegally sell it under state law -- but they never sold it. 11 What they needed to do to satisfy the elements of the federal charge, now we're looking at were they in strict 12 compliance with state law. That's not a subjective. 13 There's no scienter. That's the problem with that analysis. 14 15 defendants -- for possession for sale, that's a specific intent 16 crime. For whether you have an immunity under state law, 17 that's objective. 18 THE COURT: Okay. That's the difference. MR. RICHARDS: 19 20 THE COURT: Well, but you're talking about that 21 particular admission is going to prospective conduct, and I hear what you're saying. But then --22 23 MR. RICHARDS: It's intent. THE COURT: Well, but how about the provision under 24

paragraph 11 under the forfeiture section that says "I admit

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the subject property was derived from proceeds obtained 1 directly or indirectly as a result of the violation identified 2 above and/or was used or intended to be used to commit or to 3 facilitate the commission of the violation"? 4 5 He's saying historically, that's saying "I got all this money for" --6 MR. RICHARDS: No, no. Judge, that's federal 7 It doesn't say state violations. violations. 8 THE COURT: So what? 9 MR. RICHARDS: Well, no, because it's still illegal 10 11 under federal law. The Plea Agreement was to admit facts to violate federal marijuana law. 12 THE COURT: I don't -- but I think we're of two ships 13 that are passing in the night. The purpose of admitting these 14 15 facts is not the -- is not what I'm asking about. They 16 admitted facts. Whether or not it has an implication one way 17 or the other way for state law versus federal law, they're stuck with the admission of fact. They said that all of this 18 19 property was obtained by virtue of the business, the marijuana 20 business, that they were in. That's what they admitted. MR. RICHARDS: The property that they obtained, that 21 they forfeited, was the result of sales that violate marijuana 22 23 That's what they admitted to to effectuate the

forfeiture, a federal marijuana law. But now you're looking at, for the purposes of this criminal prosecution --

PROCEEDINGS Just, for example, the state law talks THE COURT: about whether or not it's for profit or not. Can't I take this into consideration, that there's a great deal of money being obtained from this business? MR. RICHARDS: No, because that admission relates to other assets using a civil lens to forfeit the money under a federal forfeiture statute. They conceded for the purposes of resolving their case that that money was derived from illegal marijuana sales in violation of federal law. But now you're looking at the 320 plants, not at what happened previously. You're looking at: Were they in compliance with state law? You weren't allowed to look at that before, that immunity. That was not relevant before. And we did have a motion to withdraw our Plea Agreement. THE COURT: Well, I'll get to that in a moment. MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. But, I mean, the issue is -- the narrow issue is on -- we wouldn't have discussed at the time of the plea, it wasn't contemplated for us to give legal advice to

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our clients about whether they can assert an injunctive relief on an immunity provided by state law. We didn't give them that advice, so --

> The problem, though --THE COURT:

MR. RICHARDS: -- they shouldn't be cabined with that admission for state law because you don't need to go there.

THE COURT: It's an admission. The facts are admitted

You can use them for -- it isn't, "Well, I only 1 facts. admitted it if it's used for this purpose. I didn't admit it 2 if it's used for this purpose." It's an admitted fact. 3 MR. RICHARDS: No, I know, but let's --4 5 THE COURT: We take from it what we take from it. Okay. And if the fact is "I admit it. MR. RICHARDS: 6 7 I possessed marijuana for sale that I was cultivating in violation of federal law, " you can have that fact because the 8 fact is still here today. It's still illegal under federal 9 law. But because of McIntosh, they said there's no money to 10 11 prosecute people that are in compliance with state law. We're only examining state law. That wasn't --12 THE COURT: But if there are factual admissions from 13 which I can make some inferences that go to whether or not they 14 15 satisfied state law, I can make those. I can use those facts, 16 or a better way to say it is you can't disavow those facts just 17 because we're in a different context now. MR. RICHARDS: I agree you can use them, and I don't 18 have an issue with you using them because they're true. 19 20 what they said. But the issue really is, in all fairness, no 21 one was analyzing how those facts that they admitted -- there 22 wasn't an admission to any lack of immunity under state law or

24 **THE COURT:** I understand.

any state law violations.

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MR. RICHARDS: That wasn't contemplated.

Let me ask -- I'm sorry I interrupted you. 1 THE COURT: MR. PALAZZO: That's fine, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Go ahead. 3 MR. PALAZZO: So I do think it's a little bit unfair 4 5 to try to use the language in the forfeiture agreement that was a consequence of trying to resolve the case. 6 But, again, I don't --7 There are consequences to making THE COURT: 8 admissions. 9 10 There are consequences to making MR. PALAZZO: 11 admissions and sometimes -- I think the Court should consider, based upon its own experience, why people end up making 12 admissions in terms of furtherance of resolution of cases. 13 Sometimes, you know, pleas are for convenience, pleas are for a 14 15 variety of different reasons, and the required admissions are 16 required to be made on the record in order for the validity of the plea. 17 18 THE COURT: True. MR. PALAZZO: So, again, accord whatever weight you 19 20 want to that, Your Honor. I don't necessarily believe it does 21 anything in the way of negating the application of the immunity that's afforded under state law as it relates to the grow on 22 23 July 10th, 2012. And I want to make clear that, you know, with respect to 24

the remarks of a business and all the rest of this, I mean,

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Sonny Moore's declaration was "I wasn't profiting from anything. This wasn't my business. Was I going to use the marijuana or medical cannabis being grown for purposes of my medical condition and to allay my chronic pain associated with my neck surgery? Yes."

Whatever was going to happen beyond that in terms of this issue of the collective to Ms. Ramrattan, as the Court can glean from the papers, that was all, you know, something that Mr. Pisarski was doing on his own. Sonny Moore wasn't a part of that arrangement. The agreements are not between Ms. Ramrattan and Mr. Moore. They're agreements between Ms. Ramrattan and Mr. Pisarski.

Yes. And, in fact, you can glean from the papers also that Mr. Moore wasn't even there during the time frame of the search. He wasn't interviewed. There was no contact made because he wasn't there. So I don't think he had even been there for a month or more prior to that.

But, nonetheless, it doesn't do anything to in any way detract from the protections that are afforded for this grow as it relates to the case -- this state case law. And as I was harkening to the issue of the 99 plants, the Court can, again, discern from that, hey, this is reasonable -- this 320-plant grow is reasonable based upon that recommendation that was issued by Dr. Eidelman to Mr. Pisarski back in 2012.

And then you've got the benefit of the recommendation that

was given in December of 2011 that is applicable to 2012, and you also have the benefit of Ms. Moore's recommendation that was furnished to the Court in the exhibits as well. So you have that. So you meet the criteria that's outlined.

As I mentioned, any sale that may have occurred was, again, between Mr. Pisarski and Ms. Ramrattan, if it was going to occur at all. And, again, it was something that we'd have to sort of take a wait-and-see approach to see what was yielded; but that sale is permitted under case law as long as you don't do it for profit, meaning you can defray your expenses as associated with the overhead costs and the operating expenses under case law.

So -- and, you know, with all due respect to the Court, I do disagree a little bit -- I mean, and I addressed this in my opening paragraph in my reply -- where the Government takes the position that, you know, we have to prove this by a burden -- adopting a burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. When, in fact, all of the case law that I've cited in --

THE COURT: I understand your argument.

MR. PALAZZO: Okay.

THE COURT: It's a fair point. You can certainly make the argument.

Not to just repeat this, but I do -- I am in the position of following the circuit guidance, and a lot of your argument, if I'm understanding it correctly, is that the circuit got it

wrong in *McIntosh* because they didn't properly analyze
California law in terms of the burden.

Even if I -- if that is correct, until the circuit decides it was wrong, I follow the circuit. I have to. I don't have a choice. So I understand why you make those arguments.

MR. PALAZZO: We're just preserving it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, yeah, I understand that; but you've got to understand from me that even if I were to say, "Oh, those are interesting and good arguments and all that," it's a different place where you have to persuade them.

MR. PALAZZO: Understood, and I'm going to wind up here.

And I will highlight the fact that what we've presented has been unrebutted. I mean, you can come in and you can talk about, hey, there was money in the trailer and there was a handgun in a room. None of that is relevant to the issue that the Court should be narrowly focused on, which is: Is the grow a legal grow at the time?

THE COURT: But don't some of those factors go to those questions?

MR. PALAZZO: No, I don't -- I don't think so,

Your Honor. Again, if you look at the proximity, it's not as

if they had AR-15s at the ready. It's not as if there were

guns at the green -- at the greenhouse. I mean, you've got --

THE COURT: Those examples are apropos because I would

consider those things because those -- just the things that you mention are absent here, but they certainly would be relevant factors.

From that I take it that I have to look at the whole scenario here and make some inferences on whether or not this was a for-profit operation or not is one of the factors that is determinative of whether or not you're in compliance with state law.

MR. PALAZZO: Right.

THE COURT: So you're just saying, "Well, if you look at these, they don't amount to a whole lot." They might amount to a whole lot if we had, you know, weaponry there, but we don't. So I understand your point.

MR. PALAZZO: Okay.

THE COURT: But I want to make sure that you agree with me that it's not that I should disregard any of the circumstantial situation at the grow operation; right? I can take that into account.

MR. PALAZZO: Right. I'm just saying it's not indicia of something illegal operating.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. PALAZZO: And I also want to, again, underscore the issue of the Court individualizing the analysis that would apply to each person. So, I mean, even Mr. Pisarski said multiple times, "Hey, from the outset on to present day, this

was my -- you know, this is something that I was doing." He had the arrangements for any excess that would go to the collective.

THE COURT: You're saying there's some distance or differentiation that should be had between the two defendants?

MR. PALAZZO: Sure. Sure. And, again, you know, I think that's something that, you know, should be included in the calculus.

THE COURT: I understand. I understand.

MR. PALAZZO: And that's all I kind of wanted to highlight for the Court and stress that -- oh, and let me just back up on just a couple things that the Court was mentioning during Mr. Richards' presentation.

You talked about sales tax, Your Honor. Again, there would be no sales tax applicable to Mr. Moore insofar as his conduct in connection with the grow and his recommendation and his mother's recommendation. It's not a taxable event. I don't think -- I don't think the Government has even proffered or adduced any suggestion that, you know, any transaction that occurred was a taxable event.

And I also wanted -- the last thing I wanted to say to the Court was, you know, I think that to some extent I know that this has been an evolving, you know, body of law that has developed and, you know, the rule of lenity also should apply in the Court's analysis, and I just kind of put that on the

record.

THE COURT: I don't disagree with you that it always is there, but when does it kick in? In other words, does the rule of lenity mean that you err on the side of the Defense on all the legal issues? Or the rule of lenity comes into play when you get to sentencing, doesn't it?

MR. PALAZZO: Well, no. I think the rule of lenity -THE COURT: I mean, when you're actually imposing a
sentence.

To say -- let me just see if I can fairly characterize what you said. The landscape has changed significantly and even though we're focused on 2012, I should take into account that the current reality looks at this conduct in a very different way than it did then, and so under the concepts of lenity, you know, you take that into account.

MR. PALAZZO: That's all I mean.

THE COURT: And I am not disagreeing with you that that might be appropriate, but what I'm wondering is: Okay. When and how exactly does that kick in?

It could well be that if -- I know you don't want to be at this point, but if I'm imposing a sentence, that's when I take it into account. But you're saying, "No, no. You should take the rule of lenity into account in analyzing this very specific legal question."

MR. PALAZZO: Well, I'm just saying --

I'm just not sure how I do that even if I 1 THE COURT: wanted to. 2 MR. PALAZZO: When you see these cases that come down 3 and they're interpreting these statutes from 1996 and 2003 and 4 5 you see that the trend is a more lax trend rather than a more stringent or strictly compliant trend, when you say, hey, the 6 7 mandate from the Ninth Circuit is, you know, was there strict compliance with, you know, state law, well, you see where the 8 trend is for the state law. It's kind of, you know, getting --9 it's going in a more favorable direction for the Defense, so to 10 11 speak. And so I'm just simply saying whenever you want to exert the rule of lenity, I would invite you to. 12 13 **THE COURT:** Okay. Fair enough. MR. PALAZZO: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. You know, why don't we take a 15 16 break, and why don't we use it as kind of a lunch break and 17 then we can just keep going. Is that fine with everyone? 18 MR. PALAZZO: Sure, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. And I'll make it relatively short. 19 20 How about if we start at 12:30? 21 MR. PALAZZO: That's fine, Your Honor. MS. GILBERT: That's fine, Your Honor. 22 Thank you so 23 much. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 (Luncheon recess taken at 11:43 a.m.)

1 Afternoon Session 12:34 p.m. THE COURT: Okay. We're ready to resume and, 2 Ms. Gilbert, your turn. 3 MS. GILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. We're going to call 4 5 one witness, and that's Jason Tindell, from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration. 6 7 THE COURT: Very good. MS. GILBERT: So we'll get him right now. 8 (Pause in proceedings.) 9 THE COURT: Sir, if you could come forward to the 10 witness stand to be sworn. 11 THE CLERK: Please remain standing and raise your 12 13 right hand. 14 JASON TINDELL, 15 called as a witness for the Government, having been duly sworn, 16 testified as follows: 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. THE CLERK: Thank you. Please be seated. 18 Please state your full name and spell your last name. 19 20 THE WITNESS: My name is Jason Tindell, T-I-N-D-E-L-L. 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. GILBERT: 22 And, Mr. Tindell, where do you work? 23 I work at the California Department of Tax and Fee 24 Administration, formerly the California State Board of 25

- 1 Equalization.
- 2 Q. When did the department change its name from the Board of
- 3 | Equalization to the Department of Tax and Fee Administration?
- 4 **A.** It was actually a split-off from the Board of
- 5 Equalization. The Board of Equalization still exists, but the
- 6 | majority of the tax and fee programs moved over to our
- 7 department starting on July 1st of this year.
- 8 Q. How long have you worked at this agency either prior to or
- 9 | after the split?
- 10 **A.** 13 years.
- 11 Q. And what do you do at the Department of Tax and Fee
- 12 Administration?
- 13 A. I'm a Business Taxes Specialist I. My job primarily is to
- 14 | handle collection accounts \$150,000 and above.
- 15 Q. Do you hold a public position in California?
- 16 **A.** Yes, I do.
- 17 | Q. And does -- this agency of the Department of Tax and Fee
- 18 Administration, does it maintain records?
- 19 **A.** Yes, we do.
- 20 **Q.** What kind of records does the department maintain?
- 21 **A.** We maintain records on all of our tax and fee payers.
- 22 Q. Does that include records of sellers' permits?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 | Q. And do you also maintain records of sales tax, both
- 25 reported and paid?

- 1 **A.** Yes.
- 2 Q. Are you familiar with how those records are kept?
- 3 **A.** Yes.
- 4 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about how they're kept?
- 5 **A.** All the records now are stored digitally. The returns can
- 6 be either filed by paper or they could be filed electronically.
- 7 | Paper ones, it's scanned and processed, manually inputted into
- 8 | the system, and they get sorted electronically.
- 9 Q. And is that true also of how sellers' permits records are
- 10 maintained?
- 11 **A.** Correct. Currently -- I forget which year we specifically
- 12 | went over to electronic only, but that was about -- I think
- 13 about three, four years ago. Prior to that, everything was
- 14 done by paper.
- 15 Q. Are these records -- and let's talk specifically about
- 16 | sellers' permits and then recordings of sales tax, both
- 17 reported and paid. Are those records made at or near the time
- 18 | that that information is supplied to your department?
- 19 **A.** Yes.
- 20 **Q.** And are these records regularly made and preserved as part
- 21 of the public business of your agency?
- 22 **A.** Yes.
- 23 | Q. And are you familiar with the process for searching these
- 24 records?
- 25 **A.** Yes.

- 1 Q. Have you performed searches of these records before?
- 2 A. Yes. Quite a few times.
- 3 Q. I'm going to ask you specifically about a few searches you
- 4 performed related to this case for which you're testifying.
- 5 Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 6 | the State of California has ever issued a seller's permit to
- 7 | any organization called Green Remedies?
- 8 **A.** Yes.
- 9 Q. And I'm going to show you what's been marked as Exhibit O.
- 10 MS. GILBERT: May I approach the witness?
- 11 **THE COURT:** Yes, you may.
- 12 **THE WITNESS:** (Witness examines document.)
- 13 BY MS. GILBERT:
- 14 Q. What I've handed you has both a front and a back. Do
- 15 | you -- are you familiar with this document?
- 16 **A.** Yes.
- 17 | Q. And what is it?
- 18 A. It's a copy of a California seller's permit.
- 19 **Q.** And is it -- a copy of a seller's permit for what entity?
- 20 **A.** Green Remedies, Incorporated.
- 21 MS. GILBERT: Your Honor, we move to enter this as
- 22 Exhibit O.
- 23 MR. RICHARDS: No objection.
- MR. PALAZZO: No objection.
- 25 THE COURT: Okay. Exhibit O will be admitted.

1 (Government's Exhibit O received in evidence)

2 BY MS. GILBERT:

- 3 Q. I asked you previously if you had done a diligent search
- 4 | for any sellers' permits related to an entity called
- 5 Green Remedies and you said yes. Can you tell us now the
- 6 result of the search that you performed?
- 7 **A.** I located this permit right here.
- 8 Q. Did you locate any other sellers' permits?
- 9 A. For Green Remedies, Incorporated, no.
- 10 Q. And can you tell us if -- that seller's permit that's at
- 11 | Exhibit O, what is the effective date of that permit?
- 12 **A.** The effective date of the permit was March 10th, 2016.
- 13 **Q.** And what is the end date of the permit?
- 14 A. Permits are -- at this point they are active. I would
- 15 | have to double-check my notes to see if it was still open or
- 16 | not, but permits do not have a natural end date. They are open
- 17 | and active until either they get revoked or they're closed out.
- 18 | Q. So did any organization named Green Remedies have a
- 19 | seller's permit at any time in 2012?
- 20 **A.** No.
- 21 **Q.** Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 22 | any organization named Green Remedies reported and/or paid
- 23 | sales tax at any time?
- 24 **A.** Yes.
- 25 | Q. And as a result of this search, have you determined

- 1 | whether any entity named Green Remedies reported or paid sales
- 2 tax in 2012?
- 3 A. No entity named Green Remedies, Incorporated, did not file
- 4 or pay taxes. They did not have a permit that I was able to
- 5 locate.
- 6 **Q.** And did you -- were you able to determine whether an
- 7 | entity named Green Remedies ever paid any sales tax or reported
- 8 any sales tax?
- 9 A. As I recall, they filed a return for 2016 on this permit
- 10 | we have right here. It was filed zero, no sales.
- 11 Q. Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 12 | the State of California has ever issued a seller's permit to an
- 13 organization called Covelo Cutoff Collective?
- 14 **A.** Yes.
- MS. GILBERT: And I'm going to, with Your Honor's
- 16 permission, approach the witness to present to him what's been
- 17 | marked as Exhibit N.
- 18 **THE COURT:** Yes.
- 19 **THE WITNESS:** (Witness examines document.)
- 20 BY MS. GILBERT:
- 21 Q. Mr. Tindell, are you familiar with this document?
- 22 **A.** Yes.
- 23 **Q.** And what is it?
- 24 | A. It is a seller's permit for Covelo Cutoff Collective.
- MS. GILBERT: The Government moves to admit what's

- 1 been marked as Exhibit N.
- 2 MR. RICHARDS: No objection.
- 3 **THE COURT:** Exhibit N will be admitted.
- 4 (Government's Exhibit N received in evidence)
- 5 BY MS. GILBERT:
- 6 Q. And what is the effective date of this seller's permit for
- 7 | Covelo Cutoff Collective?
- 8 A. January 1st, 2012.
- 9 **Q.** And is there an end date for this permit as well?
- 10 A. This permit was closed out as "Did Not Operate."
- 11 Q. And when was that? When was the permit closed out?
- 12 **A.** The permit was closed out as of the same date that it was
- 13 | effectively started. So it was January 1st, 2012.
- 14 Q. Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 15 | Covelo Cutoff Collective reported and/or paid sales tax?
- 16 **A.** Yes.
- 17 **Q.** And what is the result of that search?
- 18 A. I was unable to locate any payments or returns filed for
- 19 | Covelo Collective.
- 20 **Q.** Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 21 | the State of California has ever issued any seller's permit to
- 22 | an entity related to Anthony Pisarski?
- 23 **A.** Yes.
- 24 | Q. And what was the result of that search?
- 25 **A.** There was three sellers' permits that were located under

- 1 Mr. Pisarski's name. The first one was a partnership that was
- 2 2002 to 2004. After that, it became -- converted to an LLC,
- and that was between 2004 and 2006. And from 2006 to present,
- 4 | it is now a corporation.
- 5 | Q. And was this permit issued to a specific entity with a
- 6 | specific name?
- 7 **A.** Yes.
- 8 Q. And do you recall what the name of that entity was?
- 9 A. If I recall correctly, it's Northcoast Horticultural
- 10 Supply. The various versions were just that for the
- 11 partnership, the second one was LLC, and this third one had the
- 12 | incorporation attached to it.
- 13 Q. So is it correct that all of the sellers' permits you
- 14 | found that were associated with Mr. Pisarski were for an entity
- 15 | called Northcoast Horticultural Supply in three different
- 16 | corporate forms?
- 17 A. Yes, all the sellers' permits.
- 18 Q. And did you determine whether there were any other
- 19 | sellers' permits issued to Mr. Pisarski by the State of
- 20 California?
- 21 A. I was unable to locate any other issued to Mr. Pisarski.
- 22 Q. Have you conducted a diligent search to determine whether
- 23 | the State of California has ever issued a seller's permit to
- 24 | any entity related to an individual named Sonny Moore?
- 25 A. Yes, I have.

- And what was the result of that search? 1 Q. I was unable to locate any permit at all. 2 MS. GILBERT: Your Honor, we have no further 3 questions. 4 5 THE COURT: Thank you. In terms of when the tax obligation kicks in -- I realize 6 7 you -- are you a tax lawyer? THE WITNESS: I'm not a lawyer, no. 8 THE COURT: All right. But you're familiar with --9 THE WITNESS: Very. 10 11 **THE COURT:** -- the state taxes? 12 THE WITNESS: Correct. 13 THE COURT: When you are talking about marijuana cultivation, where does the state sales tax kick in? In other 14 15 words, is it at the grower stage, the collective stage, the 16 dispensary stage? When does -- tell me when sales tax applies. 17 THE WITNESS: Sales --MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, may I just make one -- I 18 don't mean to object to your question, but we were never --19 20 THE COURT: It's never smart to object to a judge's question, but go ahead. 21 22 MR. RICHARDS: No, I'm not. Just for the record, he 23 was offered as a records witness, so there was no --
- 25 | MR. RICHARDS: -- declaration that he was going to

THE COURT: Notice?

provide any expert testimony. I would have voir dired him and, 1 I mean, I would have -- that's a very loaded issue, the tax 2 issue, and that's why I thought he was just going to talk about 3 State Board of Equalization permits issued/not issued. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, certainly Ms. Gilbert didn't do this, I did it; and I note your objection, but I do want an 6 answer to the question. 7 So go ahead. 8 THE WITNESS: Sales tax applies at the retail sale. 9 So in the case of a collective, it would be from the collective 10 11 to a patient. THE COURT: All right. How about from the grower 12 to -- well, I suppose the distinction between grower and 13 collective is somewhat complicated; but if someone is simply a 14 15 grower and sells to, say, a dispensary, is there a sales tax 16 obligation there? 17 THE WITNESS: There would be one for -- sales tax, the money itself, no; but for a reporting obligation, anybody who 18 19 sells tangible personal property in the state, even if they 20 would be considered a reseller at that point, they would be 21 required to hold a permit. THE COURT: But nothing particular to marijuana? 22 23 The law is going to change on THE WITNESS:

January 1st, but as we're speaking as of right now, they would

just be required to hold a permit and note their sales, you

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- 1 know, for resale if that's what they're doing. There would be no tax obligation at this time.
- 3 **THE COURT:** Okay.
- 4 All right, Mr. Richards.
- 5 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, just briefly based on that 6 question.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. RICHARDS:

- 9 **Q.** You testified correctly, I believe, that the sales tax obligation doesn't trigger until the retail sale; correct?
- 11 **A.** The obligation to pay sales tax, correct.
- 12 Q. Right. And just so the record is clear so we don't have a
- 13 debate later on, retail sale -- your understanding of a retail
- 14 | sale in this context would be someone walking into a store, a
- 15 | marijuana dispensary across the street, and purchasing
- 16 | marijuana at the cash register and they collect the sales tax;
- 17 | correct?
- 18 A. Correct, the person who would be considered the end
- 19 consumer.
- 20 **Q.** The end consumer?
- 21 A. Correct. If they went off and resold it, there would
- 22 be -- generally they would issue their own seller's permit, so
- 23 | they would purchase it tax free.
- 24 Q. Right. So it's your understanding that when the grower is
- 25 | providing the marijuana to that dispensary, that the sale tax

- 1 | event occurs at the end for the resale -- the consumer;
- 2 | correct?
- 3 A. Yeah, when it becomes taxable.
- 4 Q. It's not double taxed?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. Okay. I'm leaving that area.
- 7 All right. With respect to the searches that you did for
- 8 | these sellers' permits, you don't have any personal knowledge
- 9 as to why certain permits were issued to these individuals and
- 10 | what they were used for; correct?
- 11 | A. On the records it would indicate what -- the intent to
- 12 | what they were going to sell. If I had access to being able to
- 13 search those records, I could go through everything and say
- 14 | what their intent was because on the application they would
- 15 | explain what they're going to sell.
- 16 Q. Did you speak to any of these people?
- 17 **A.** Speak to any of the permit holders?
- 18 **Q.** Yes.
- 19 **A.** No.
- 20 **Q.** Okay. Did you ever go out to any of these locations and
- 21 | see what was going on there?
- 22 **A.** No.
- 23 | Q. All right. And with respect to the -- your current job
- 24 | for the State Board of Equalization -- I just want to be clear
- 25 | about your expertise or your job duty -- is you're not charged

- 1 | with investigating marijuana tax issues; correct?
- 2 A. I have accounts that do pertain to, yeah, collectives if
- 3 that's your question.
- 4 Q. Are you an auditor?
- 5 **A.** No.
- 6 Q. Are you a tax enforcement agent?
- 7 **A.** Compliance representative, correct.
- 8 Q. Compliance -- you're a compliance representative?
- 9 A. Correct. My job entails many different things. I mean,
- 10 part of it is making sure people are, you know, properly
- 11 permitized, making sure that what they are reporting is also
- 12 | correct as well. I'll go through and -- not necessarily go
- 13 | through a detailed audit, but I will go through and make sure,
- 14 you know, maybe their merchant statements are reflected in
- 15 | their sales tax returns and stuff like that.
- 16 **Q.** Okay. And just one last question. When you were talking
- 17 | about the growers, just so the record is clear, if you're
- 18 growing marijuana at your house, isn't it true that you're not
- 19 required to have a seller's permit?
- 20 **A.** If you are going to resell it, you are required to have a
- 21 | seller's permit. If it is just for your personal consumption,
- 22 then, no.
- 23 | Q. Well, no, you just said, though -- you testified earlier,
- 24 and I was very clear in my question, the taxable event occurs
- 25 | at the retail sale; correct?

- 1 A. The taxable part, but you're still required to hold a
- 2 | seller's permit if you are going to resell something. That's
- 3 part of the way of tracing items. So if somebody comes in for
- 4 an audit, you know, you have to go back to the suppliers. And
- 5 | so you have to go to the suppliers because what ends up
- 6 | happening is, say, the collective didn't have a resale permit,
- 7 | you know, they would go back and say, "Well, there's no resale
- 8 | card here. " That would end up being a taxable event going back
- 9 maybe to the growers.
- 10 **Q.** No, but that's -- if the grower brings the medical
- 11 | marijuana to, let's say, a dispensary across the street and
- 12 | they have a resale permit and they collect the tax, that's the
- 13 | end of your inquiry; correct?
- 14 **A.** If the grower cannot document that it was for resale, then
- 15 | we'd consider that a taxable event. So if they weren't able to
- 16 | prove that the sale to the collective -- maybe the collective
- 17 | was just going to consume it.
- 18 | Q. No, no. Let me just try to ask my question again. Just
- 19 listen carefully.
- 20 A. All right.
- 21 Q. Following up on your testimony that the taxable event
- 22 occurs at the retail level --
- 23 **A.** Uh-huh.
- 24 | Q. -- you don't disagree with that; correct?
- 25 **A.** When the sales tax would be due, correct.

- 1 Q. Right. So assuming the grower delivers the medical
- 2 cannabis to a retailer that has a valid seller's permit and
- 3 | collects the sales tax, that's the end of your inquiry;
- 4 correct?
- 5 **A.** Correct, if they have a valid seller's permit.
- 6 Q. Right. So the only time this would come into a problem
- 7 | for a grower, hypothetically, is if the person that received
- 8 | that marijuana or cannabis that they were selling at the retail
- 9 level somehow did not have a seller's permit and did not
- 10 | collect the tax; correct?
- 11 **A.** Or if the grower could not document that the person did.
- 12 Q. Right.
- 13 A. If they didn't accept the resale card. They have to
- 14 | accept -- technically you would have to accept the resale card
- 15 | in order to sell to them. There should be a resale card on
- 16 | file in order for them to sell it to them without tax.
- 17 | Q. If the -- but I quess -- I'm not trying to mix words with
- 18 | you, but I just want to -- in this -- you don't know the issues
- 19 | in this case --
- 20 **A.** No, I don't.
- 21 | Q. -- so I just want to make it clear because it's not
- 22 | getting clear.
- 23 If tax is collected at the retail level, isn't it true you
- 24 | don't go back and collect more tax from the person that
- 25 | supplied the medical cannabis? Correct?

- 1 A. If it's documented, correct.
- 2 Q. Okay. So if it's not documented, like let's just say the
- 3 grower doesn't have a resale number, then the risk is that they
- 4 | may have to pay the tax; right? If for some reason the
- 5 retailer doesn't pay and they don't have a permit, the risk
- 6 | that they take is they may owe tax; correct?
- 7 **A.** Correct, if they don't have it documented.
- 8 Q. Right. But that's the risk. In other words, the -- I'm
- 9 | just trying to make it clear. The reason why you'd want to get
- 10 | a resale number is if somehow the retailer didn't collect the
- 11 | tax, then you would possibly not be exempt from the sales tax
- 12 requirement; correct?
- 13 **A.** By law, you're required to hold a permit if you're going
- 14 | to sell tangible personal property in the state of California,
- 15 | which medical marijuana is.
- 16 **Q.** But --
- 17 **A.** So a grower is required by law. Each sale they're
- 18 required to have a permit.
- 19 Q. But there's no specific Revenue and Taxation Code that
- 20 deals with medical marijuana, correct, in 2012?
- 21 **A.** It's under tangible -- the sale of tangible personal
- 22 property.
- 23 Q. I know, but it's a catchall. There's a lot of things that
- 24 | are tangible personal property; right?
- 25 **A.** Right. And anybody who's going to sell them or resell

- 1 them, they have to hold a permit in the state of California.
- 2 Q. But let's just say I want to sell my car tomorrow, you
- 3 know, my Dodge, and I sell it to a dealer.
- 4 **A.** That's --
- 5 **Q.** I don't have a resale number; right?
- 6 A. That's a completely different example because that's
- 7 | considered a use tax, not a sales tax issue. Only -- this is
- 8 | kind of way off scope, but in order to sell a vehicle and be
- 9 required to collect the sales tax, you have to have a
- 10 | California Department of Motor Vehicles dealer's license. So
- 11 that example doesn't quite work.
- 12 Q. Okay. What about some gold coins?
- 13 A. Depending on the dollar amount, that could be different.
- 14 Q. What about some bananas?
- 15 A. Bananas are food and for -- is it human consumption or for
- 16 | a monkey? I mean, for a monkey, it would be taxable. For a
- 17 | person, human consumption, no.
- 18 **Q.** What about dog food?
- 19 A. Dog food would be taxable.
- 20 Q. Okay. So if I sold some dog food to the 7-Eleven and I
- 21 | didn't have a resale permit and the 7-Eleven paid the tax
- 22 | legally, I wouldn't owe the tax; correct?
- 23 **A.** One more time. Will you rephrase that?
- 24 **Q.** If I took something and I sold it to a retailer --
- 25 A. Correct.

- 1 Q. -- dog food -- which is typically taxable; right?
- 2 **A.** Uh-huh.
- 3 **Q.** Yes?

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- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 | Q. You've got to say "yes."
- -- and the 7-Eleven took my dog food and they sold the dog
 food to somebody else and they collected the sales tax, that's
 the end of the taxable event; correct?
 - A. That instance -- I hate to do this again -- that would be considered an occasional sale and it wouldn't have been taxable regardless. But let's just say he regularly sold dog food.
- Q. What if I just occasionally sold dog food? Occasionally, let's just go with that. So you're saying --

14 **THE COURT:** We're getting out into the ocean here.

MR. RICHARDS: Right.

THE WITNESS: Sales tax is --

THE COURT: I understand the point you're trying to drive home, but every example is going to be met with a new technical issue. So I know what you're getting at.

MR. RICHARDS: All right.

THE COURT: And so -- but let me go through this scenario with you to make sure I understand this.

And let's talk about three different scenarios. One is a marijuana grower. And to the extent you can focus on 2012, I know that's difficult, but that's the temporal context. In

2012 a marijuana grower who simply has a patient or a medical prescription and uses the marijuana for either him or herself or for their primary caregiver for another, they grow it, they use it, I take it no permit is required; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Scenario number two, the grower is not connected to a collective but grows the marijuana and then sells it to a collective who then down the chain sells it. Is a seller's permit required by the grower in that scenario?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So if a grower is part of a collective, not selling to the collective but is part of the --- grows and then is a member of the collective and that collective then sells marijuana downstream to a dispensary or to users, is a permit required?

THE WITNESS: The collective should have one there if the grower is part of the collective.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

BY MR. RICHARDS:

- **Q.** On the judge's example, whether they have a permit or not, there's no taxable event until it gets to the retail; correct?
- 22 A. Correct.

Q. All right. So the only prejudice to the collective not having a permit would be that if the retailer screws up, for lack of a better word, the collective may not be able to claim

- 1 a tax exemption; correct?
- 2 **A.** You mean the grower would not be able to claim an
- 3 exemption?
- 4 Q. Well, the judge used the example if the grower is a member
- 5 of the collective --
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 **Q.** -- and the marijuana is given to the collective and they
- 8 bring it to the dispensary and the dispensary does not collect
- 9 the tax, the collective runs the risk of having to potentially
- 10 lose their tax exemption and pay that sales tax; right?
- 11 **A.** It would be -- the sale would be a taxable transaction
- 12 | from the collective --
- 13 Q. Because the --
- 14 A. -- regardless because there wouldn't be a resale. In the
- 15 | first example the grower was separate from the collective. So
- 16 | the grower to the collective. That's a sale for resale. This
- 17 one, the collective has the grower in there so basically
- 18 | they're the ones who are growing it and selling it. So there
- 19 | wouldn't be any transaction because it's the -- it would be
- 20 considered the same entity.
- 21 **Q.** Right.
- 22 | A. It would all be under the collective. But if the grower
- 23 | and the collective are separate, then there is a transfer;
- 24 | there is, you know, tangible personal property. There would be
- 25 | a sale. This way, you know, you grow and you sell it, so there

- 1 | would only be one sale to the end consumer.
- 2 Q. Well, it's not to the end consumer. It's to the
- dispensary who's selling it to the consumer.
- 4 A. So you have the -- oh, the collective and the dispensary
- 5 | are separate?
- 6 Q. Yeah. This is real critical not to merge everything.
- 7 Yes.
- Just so -- because this gets confusing later on when you
- 9 look at it.
- 10 The dispensary is a dispensary. For your mind, that's a
- 11 | storefront. Okay?
- 12 **A.** Uh-huh.
- 13 Q. The collective is a group of people that collectivize and
- 14 grow marijuana and sometimes exchange it amongst each other.
- 15 But as you said, that's not a taxable event between members;
- 16 | correct?
- 17 **A.** If they are exchanging it in between themselves in the
- 18 | collective?
- 19 **Q.** Yes.
- 20 A. So they're selling it?
- 21 Q. No. Exchanging it.
- 22 **A.** Barter?
- 23 Q. Okay. Let's just make it easy. The retail seller to the
- 24 person on the street, they pay the sales tax; right?
- 25 A. Correct.

- 1 Q. And as long -- if the sales tax is collected -- going back
- 2 to the dispensary, going back to the collective -- you don't
- 3 collect the sales tax twice; correct?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 | Q. Okay. So the only risk to those people before the person
- 6 that buys it at the storefront, they have a risk that if for
- 7 | some reason their permit is not valid or nonexistent and the
- 8 | retailer fails to collect the sales tax, they could be liable
- 9 for the sales tax; right?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 Q. But if they have the permit and they keep records, then
- 12 | that protects them from a taxable event; right?
- 13 | A. Correct.
- 14 MR. RICHARDS: I think I've covered that.
- 15 **THE COURT:** Let me make sure, though, I understand.
- 16 Did you -- I think your testimony was separate and apart
- 17 | from any tax obligation, there is a state requirement to have a
- 18 permit.
- 19 **THE WITNESS:** For the sale of tangible personal
- 20 property in this state.
- 21 **THE COURT:** Right. Which would include marijuana?
- 22 **THE WITNESS:** Correct.
- 23 **THE COURT:** And that is not keyed one way or the other
- 24 | to a taxable event. It is you have to have a permit.
- 25 **THE WITNESS:** Correct. The sellers' permits aren't

tied all the way down to the taxable event. It's just to trace

it all the way back.

THE COURT: Understood. Okay.

BY MR. RICHARDS:

Q. But the question -- I'm following up on your question -- when you say you have to have a permit -- okay? -- if you don't have a permit, what's the consequence?

THE COURT: Well, my question wasn't the consequence of not having a permit. My question is: What is the state requirement as to what you have to have?

The testimony was you have to have a permit. I don't -my question was not: What are the consequences if you don't
have a permit? I want to know what the requirements are under
state law. That was my question.

MR. RICHARDS: Okay. But I guess what I'm trying -THE COURT: And I understand your point is the only
risk is the tax issue. I understand that, but that wasn't my
question. So you don't have to keep following up my question
with that question.

MR. RICHARDS: No, I won't, Your Honor. But then just on an aside, the issue of whether you need a resell permit when you're selling tangible personal property, there's no crime if you don't have the permit is what I'm saying, is that you risk a sales tax liability. So that's what I was trying to establish.

It's not like the state says "Every time you sell tangible personal property if you don't have this sales tax permit, you're in big trouble. You're in tax trouble potentially."

THE COURT: And we should -- this is an aside. The rider is not talking about complying only with state law that implicates criminal conduct or other. It's complying with state requirements. It's not looking at whether or not the state requirement has a consequence if you don't have the -- if you don't comply.

I think it says if the state says you have to have a permit, you have to have a permit. It doesn't matter whether or not if you didn't get a permit, nothing bad is going to happen to you. That's not what the rider says. The rider says you've got to comply with the state requirements, and my question was: Is it a state requirement that they have a permit? Very simple.

BY MR. RICHARDS:

- Q. When the judge asked you is it a state requirement to have a permit for tangible personal property, when does that -- does that requirement only kick in if there's a sale that is a taxable event?
- **A.** No.

- Q. Okay. When -- well, what -- if you're not selling tangible personal property, you don't need a permit; correct?
 - **A.** If you're not selling tangible personal property within

- 1 | the state of California, correct.
- 2 Q. Right. So in an occasional sale, you don't need a
- 3 seller's permit for tangible personal property; correct?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. Okay. So what's the definition of an occasional sale?
- 6 A. It is -- basically it's two or less events in a 12-month
- 7 period.
- 8 Q. Okay. So, hypothetically, if someone was -- if someone
- 9 was doing something that only had an event once a year, then
- 10 | that's occasional; correct?
- 11 **A.** It also depends on scope, and "scope" is not actually
- 12 defined. So it's kind of up to the department on what they
- consider scope. Generally a lot of times it's about \$10,000.
- 14 | So a sale of \$10,000 or more, they would require a permit. It
- 15 | wouldn't be considered an occasional sale. There's no
- 16 definition on "scope." It's left up to the department.
- 17 **Q.** So it's a subjective thing?
- 18 A. Sounds like it.
- 19 Q. Okay. So it's not like if someone was reading the code,
- 20 | though, is it fair to say that the law simply says if you have
- 21 | a sale two or less times a year, you need -- or two or more
- 22 | times a year, you need a personal use permit?
- 23 **A.** It also says depending on the scope and the other factors.
- 24 | I do not have the law in front of me, so I can't quote it. But
- 25 | it was more intended somebody is having a garage sale, they

- 1 have two garage sales. They don't want the neighbors calling
- 2 out -- you know, sending people out there for \$5 in tax. So it
- 3 was one of those things that I guess over the years they just
- 4 | kind of left it open to the interpretation of the department to
- 5 | figure out what is actually worthwhile, what's worth our time
- 6 going out there.
- 7 | Q. And what is the department's purpose in having a permit
- 8 issued to somebody -- or somebody getting a permit if they're
- 9 | not -- if they're supplying the product to a retailer?
- 10 A. It's to trace it.
- 11 **Q.** For tracing purposes?
- 12 **A.** For audit purposes, correct.
- 13 **Q.** Okay.
- 14 A. Without being able to go back to figure out who suppliers
- 15 | are and other items, it would be nearly impossible to, you
- 16 | know, gain compliance. Sales tax is voluntary compliance.
- 17 | Q. So if the grower is a member of the retail collective,
- 18 | then the permit would be issued to the retail collective. Like
- 19 when we were talking earlier, you referenced, oh, is the
- 20 dispensary the collective. Remember that testimony?
- 21 **A.** Yes.
- 22 Q. So if a grower was a member of the dispensary that was
- 23 | selling the retail marijuana -- retail medical cannabis, then
- 24 | they wouldn't need an individual permit because you would use
- 25 | the permit of the retail dispensary; correct?

- 1 A. If they aren't selling it, correct. If they are just the
- 2 grower and they're providing it as part of the collective,
- 3 correct. If they were selling it, that would be -- yeah, they
- 4 | would be required to hold a permit. It would be a separate
- 5 | transaction; but if they're part of a collective, they're
- 6 growing it on behalf of the collective, they're not -- you
- 7 know, they're not selling it, then correct.
- 8 Q. So in your experience, because you said you do these, is a
- 9 | lot of these dispensaries collectives that sell the medical
- 10 marijuana?
- 11 **A.** They're -- most of them are considered, yeah,
- 12 | collectives --
- 13 Q. They're collectives. So basically --
- 14 A. -- who do the retail sale.
- 15 **Q.** So the collective also does retail sales?
- 16 **A.** Yes.
- 17 **Q.** So --
- 18 A. Sometimes they do buy from growers. Sometimes they grow
- 19 their own. It just depends. Each operation is different.
- 20 \ Q. So if a grower at the time they actually did a transaction
- 21 | was a member of a retail collective, then they don't need a
- 22 | specific personal use permit themselves; correct?
- 23 | A. If they aren't selling it. If they are selling it, then
- 24 | that wouldn't matter. It all depends if they're acting on
- 25 | behalf of the collective or are they acting on their own behalf

- 1 and selling it. I mean --
- 2 Q. If the collective has grower members and those grower
- 3 | members provide the medical cannabis to the collective and then
- 4 | the collective retail sells it, the only resale number required
- 5 | is the one the collective issues; correct?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 MR. RICHARDS: All right. Thank you.
- 8 **THE COURT:** Thank you.
- 9 Ms. Gilbert, I know I opened up quite the door there,
- 10 so --

13

- 11 MS. GILBERT: Let me just ask one clarifying question
- 12 because I don't want to open up any other doors.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

- 14 BY MS. GILBERT:
- 15 Q. If -- I think you had said both that -- let's say you have
- 16 | a case where a grower is part of a collective and a grower is
- 17 | supplying medical marijuana to the collective. In that case,
- 18 | is it correct that you said that the collective would need to
- 19 | have the seller's permit?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 **Q.** You had previously said also something about a reporting
- 22 requirement, which is separate than actually paying the taxes.
- 23 | Would the collective in that case be required to report the
- 24 | sales for purposes of tax, or --
- 25 A. Correct.

- Q. All right. So there's both a permit requirement, there's a reporting requirement, and then the taxable event happens at a different time; is that right?
 - A. Yeah. The taxable event occurs at the retail sale.
 - Q. At the retail sale.

If the grower was just supplying marijuana to a collective and the grower was part of that collective and the collective in turn reimbursed the grower for the expense of providing that marijuana and then that marijuana was distributed amongst the members of the collective, what are the obligations vis-a-vis a permit and reporting for sales tax purposes in that scenario?

A. It would depend on whether or not we'd consider it a separate transaction or not. That's where the whole issue of the collective comes into play. Are they just signed up for being a member of the collective, or are they actually part of the collective, they all work together?

You know, if it is a true collective, then the collective would have the permit. If this person is a grower who just signed up on a piece of, you know, paper but then the collective gives them money and pays them money and they're taking profit and everything else, it would appear that it was a separate transaction. It just depends. Without knowing all the background of this case, it could be a lot of different things.

Q. But I guess let me be -- let's make it really simple. In

- 1 | either of the scenarios, someone has to have a seller's permit;
- 2 | is that right?
- 3 A. Correct.
- 4 Q. So either the collective has to have a permit or in some
- 5 cases, if it's a separate sale, the actual grower has to have a
- 6 | permit; is that what you're saying?
- 7 **A.** The grower and the collective, correct.
- 8 **Q.** And both would have to have a permit?
- 9 A. Correct. If the grower was operating under the
- 10 | collective, they would use the collective's seller's permit.
- 11 **Q.** But in either scenario, the collective is required to have
- 12 | a seller's permit?
- 13 **A.** Yes.

17

- 14 MS. GILBERT: That's it. No further questions.
- MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, just one more follow-up.
- 16 **THE COURT:** Okay.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

- 18 BY MR. RICHARDS:
- 19 Q. When you're growing marijuana at your house, you're not
- 20 required to have a permit at any specific time; correct?
- 21 A. For 2012, yeah, correct.
- 22 **Q.** Right. So the permit requirement comes into play at the
- 23 | time the marijuana is harvested or processed. And then if
- 24 | you're going to do a sale that requires a permit, then you need
- 25 to get the permit; correct?

- 1 A. If it's -- correct. If it's for home use, your own personal consumption, then no permit is required.
 - Q. Yeah, but that -- I'm not -- I appreciate that, but this is just a technical point. Let's just say hypothetically --

THE COURT: Let me see if I can just -- if you're planning to make a sale in six months but you haven't gotten to the point, you're in the ramp-up stage, do you need a permit before you actually get to the point where you want to sell the product? When do you have to get the permit if you've got a sale contemplated?

THE WITNESS: In this -- if you wanted to buy things, say, to incorporate and use in your resale card to maybe buy some fertilizer in order to use it, you would get it right away. So you can, you know, purchase the fertilizer because you're using it for something you'd resell. If you're just growing it for, say, you don't want any of these tax exemptions, it would be when you were going to sell.

THE COURT: Okay.

- MR. RICHARDS: Okay. Does that -- because,

 Your Honor, there was no evidence about anybody trying to get
 tax-free fertilizer.
- Q. So what you just said about the tax-free, that's if you wanted to get the advantages of having tax-free fertilizer, housing materials, then you'd want --
 - A. Correct.

- 1 Q. -- to get the resale number earlier because you wouldn't
- 2 | want to pay sales tax?
- 3 A. It's not required until the sale.
- 4 Q. Right. But let's say you didn't care about that or that
- 5 | wasn't any issue. You're not breaking any law by waiting six
- 6 months, as the judge said, until you're about to sell it. That
- 7 | that's when you get the permit; correct?
- 8 A. Any law for sales and use tax, correct.
- 9 Q. Sales and use tax. So, in other words, you're not
- 10 required to have a permit simply because you may sell something
- 11 | in the future; correct?
- 12 A. Correct.
- 13 MR. RICHARDS: All right. Thank you.
- 14 **THE COURT:** Ms. Gilbert?
- MS. GILBERT: We have no further questions,
- 16 Your Honor.
- 17 | THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may step down.
- 18 MS. GILBERT: I'm going to approach and grab these two
- 19 exhibits.
- 20 May the witness be dismissed, Your Honor?
- 21 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. I know that was longer
- 22 | than you had anticipated. Thank you very much.
- 23 **THE WITNESS:** Thank you.
- 24 (Witness excused.)
- 25 MS. GILBERT: At this point, Your Honor, the

Government rests. 1 Okay. So the record is clear, did you 2 THE COURT: move to admit other of these exhibits and have they all been 3 admitted by stipulation, or where are we on these? 4 5 MS. GILBERT: No, Your Honor. We didn't discuss that. 6 We're happy to discuss moving them -- admitting them by stipulation in the same manner that the Court took notice of 7 the defendants' submissions, but we don't feel strongly either 8 way. We think that the facts are established already. 9 THE COURT: Well, I'll follow your lead. If you --10 11 I'm not going to ask you to admit anything that -- it's up to If you're not moving to admit it, we won't have it. 12 MS. GILBERT: Does the Defense have any objections? 13 MR. RICHARDS: In the spirit of extreme collegiality, 14 15 we will do whatever the Government wants us to do on this 16 issue. No problem. 17 MS. GILBERT: Well, then, we'd move to admit the photographs that we've presented in Exhibits A through M. 18 THE COURT: A through M. Okay. A through M will be 19 20 admitted. 21 (Government's Exhibits A through M received in evidence) THE COURT: And then you've admitted the other --22 23 MS. GILBERT: And then we are not moving to admit --THE COURT: P? 24 MS. GILBERT: -- P. We will not move to admit P. 25

THE COURT: Okay. Well, now you've rested in terms of evidentiary submission, but let me ask you some questions about -- well, let me just ask you to go ahead and begin the discussion, and then I'll reserve the right to interrupt from time to time with questions. So go ahead.

MS. GILBERT: Please do, Your Honor. And I'm happy to just address your questions if that's more focused.

But I think there are just a few -- I think this is actually fairly straightforward in some ways. *McIntosh* controls here. The only question is whether or not the defendants strictly complied with all relevant law imposed by the state on the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana. That's the standard here. And that is strict compliance with all California law.

That includes the Compassionate Care Act, that includes the medical marijuana program, and that includes the Attorney General's guidelines discussing those programs. And those guidelines were the California legislature --

THE COURT: Well, those guidelines, the argument the Defense makes is those aren't statutory requirements of the state. That's guidance that the Attorney General is providing. But failure to, quote/unquote, "comply" with an Attorney General interpretation or guidance, is that -- why should that be deemed to be a failure to comply --

MS. GILBERT: Well --

THE COURT: -- for the rider?

MS. GILBERT: I think it -- so under -- it seems in California law they look -- they give -- they're not -- courts are not bound by the AG guidelines, but they certainly look to them as an interpretation of the relevant provisions on medical marijuana law.

Many of the cases cited by the defendants, including

People versus London, rely on the AG guidelines when

determining the scope of conduct and whether or not in those

cases -- because they're state cases they're determining

whether or not there should be a jury instruction on immunity

based on the defendant's compliance with the medical marijuana

program. But the state cases look to the California AG

guidelines as well in order to elucidate what the definition is

of the medical marijuana program.

Furthermore, the other courts that have looked at this issue on the federal level, the District Court in the Eastern District of California in both *Gentile* and *Daleman also* relied on the AG guidelines.

But we can even separate from the AG guidelines. Almost all of them are enshrined -- are interpretations of pretty clear standards in the medical marijuana program, and they are specifically regarding the collectives where I think the law there is complicated to comply with, to be sure.

But, furthermore, you have the California -- as it was

then known, the California Board of Equalization issued two special notices that specifically said that any transactions involving marijuana must comply by getting permits, and that is supported by the testimony here from the Board of -- excuse me -- the Department of Tax and Fee Administration employee.

So I think even if you look -- even if you don't believe that the guidelines are binding, they're certainly relevant to the inquiry.

And McIntosh also says -- it doesn't limit itself to
California law as enshrined in the code. It says all
California law and there is, I think, a good argument that that
includes the AG guidelines.

Furthermore, I think that Your Honor previously discussed, and I think defendants have talked about, the time period that we're looking at here. The defendants pled to conduct beginning at a date unknown and continuing to July 10th of 2012.

Now, we specifically are looking at the 320 plants that form the basis for this Indictment, but the defendants themselves, specifically Defendant Pisarski himself states in his own declaration that he began supplying marijuana to the two collectives discussed, the Covelo Cutoff Collective and the informal collective involving Ms. Ramrattan, in 2010. Both the Ramrattan declaration and the Apodaca declaration specifically also state that Mr. Pisarski started supplying them with

1 | marijuana in 2010.

I think in this case it's extremely relevant to look to the entire course of conduct. They both admitted in their Plea Agreement that they intended to sell marijuana; and you have, then, information that the defendants themselves submitted that they had already been selling or supplying marijuana to collectives as of 2010. So --

as I understand it, the beginning premise is a focus on the federal charge. The federal charge is possession with intent to do something. And they're then saying, if I'm hearing them correctly, in a case, for example, where the federal charge was based on a transaction that had already occurred, that would be a clearer circumstance because if it had already occurred, you look at when the sale, for example, had happened and you look at what California law was and were they in compliance with California law on the date of sale.

Here, because it's possession with intent to distribute or to sell, that if we look at the state of the law in 2012, a lot of these state requirements aren't really requirements until the future event occurs. And, therefore, they are, quote/unquote, "in compliance" because the effect of this nature of the charge versus the compliance requirements, if I'm hearing them correctly.

MR. RICHARDS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Respond to why that's not the way it should be analyzed.

MS. GILBERT: Absolutely, Your Honor. And I think that falls into sort of two buckets. Let me start with the collective bucket because that wouldn't apply to the second basis for their claim that they were in compliance, which is that they were merely patients growing for their own use. I'll address that in a moment, but let me start with the collective.

In this case let's say that we're not even looking at their past conduct involving their relationships with the two collectives that they've admitted. They're intending to sell to the collectives. They've told us the two collectives that they're intending to sell to. They have told us nothing else about these collectives. They haven't made any effort to establish that they intended to sell to collectives that they knew contained only qualified patients and primary caregivers. They haven't made any -- they haven't shown that they were keeping track of the expenses for growing marijuana.

They already had, I think you'll see in the Government Exhibit A, and the defendants have admitted, they had 320 live plants. They clearly had spent money to produce those plants, to grow them, their time, their costs, their expenses. None of that has been documented.

In order for them to have intended to supply to a collective and to be in compliance with California law, they

would have had to be doing all of that, or they would have at the time of sale have had to have all of that available. There's no evidence that anything was --

THE COURT: But if they're right and theoretically they could come up to speed and be in compliance at the moment of sale, for example, doesn't that create an issue as to the degree to which compliance would have been affected and had to be affected for purposes of the rider on the operative date of the criminal conduct?

MS. GILBERT: Well, I think we need to look at the entire picture here. The defendants haven't argued and have made no claim that they intended to comply with any of these requirements. Instead, they've said that none of those requirements had actually applied to them.

If they had come in and put in declarations that said,

"Yes, I intended to sell to this collective and I was intending
to track all of my expenses and I was intending to ensure that
I was only reimbursed for the exact costs of operations, and I
intended to make no profit and I was going to demonstrate that
in these ways and I intended to ensure that the collective
members were all qualified patients and/or primary caregivers
of those patients, " they've made absolutely no showing of that
whatsoever. They haven't even made that argument, Your Honor.

I think under those circumstances, the idea that they were actually in strict compliance on the day, on the last day of

the conduct, they have certainly not met that burden by any measure.

And that is certainly consistent with what the court said in *Gentile* where in that case they even were providing -- in that case the defendants provided some records of sales, some records of the transactions. Here, they put forward absolutely nothing.

But let's set aside the collective argument. They also say that they were complying with California law under just the Compassionate Use Act, which would mean that it was medical marijuana used for their -- only for their personal use.

First, they've already admitted that they intended to sell the marijuana elsewhere and that they previously did so. I think that completely undermines their argument that they were intending to only use the marijuana that they were growing for themselves.

Second, let's say that they were -- let's say -- put that to the side. They have presented insufficient evidence to show that they actually had enough prescriptions to cover all of the plants that were found on their property.

THE COURT: You think strict compliance requires the whole terrain to be occupied by a prescription that would account for all of that?

MS. GILBERT: I think so. I mean, so what I'm relying on, Your Honor, is -- and this relates to an argument that the

PROCEEDINGS Defense made as well, and I think we all agree that under California law -- and this is in People versus Kelly -- for the Compassionate Use Act to cover someone's conduct, it has to be marijuana reasonably related to current medical needs. So if we look to -- I'm looking at just -- and, again, we have a lot of objections to the evidence provided by the defendants, but I'm going to assume that it's all credible. Let's assume that. Mr. Pisarski has put forward a recommendation that says he should have 99 plants for himself for his own use. Okay. Mr. Moore has stated in his declaration that he had a

Mr. Moore has stated in his declaration that he had a valid recommendation at the time also for 99 plants. That recommendation still has not been submitted. So I just took a look at what's marked as Document 190-1, which the Defense moved to admit and the Court took under advisement that it was --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GILBERT: -- that's not even a recommendation for a prescription. That's a form that the defendant looks like he filled out for a clinic in order for the clinic to later provide him with a recommendation, but there's no recommendation there.

Okay. So let's instead say we'll credit Moore's statement himself that he had a recommendation for 99 plants. We can look to the recommendation that he did submit, which was for

2015, and that's at Docket 175-1, which says 99 plants. Okay.

So that gets us 99 plants for Pisarski, 99 plants for Moore.

They third argue that they were growing for Pamela Moore, who is Mr. Moore's mother. Mr. Pisarski has submitted

Ms. Moore's recommendation. That includes no number for the number of plants. There is no declaration from Ms. Moore about how many plants she needed to reasonably treat her current medical needs in 2012. She hasn't testified here, of course, either.

Finally, we have on the day of the search that was executed here on July 10th of 2012, Ms. Moore was interviewed by DEA Agent John Rasmussen, and she claimed that seven of the 327 plants found there were hers. Only seven. So I think that that -- I think ascribing any amount to Ms. Moore is impossible in this case given the evidence that we have.

Even if you said Ms. Moore can have 99 plants, 99 times 3 does not add up to 327 plants. And I know that I'm using two different numbers here, and I'll just clarify.

The search recovered 327 marijuana plants. Seven were growing on the outside of the residence, and those are the seven that were claimed by Ms. Moore, Defendant Moore's mother; 320 were growing inside the two greenhouses, and those are the -- that's the number that the defendants have pled to and admitted to in their factual statement of their Plea Agreement.

So even if you put aside all of the collective business,

which the defendants themselves have raised as a defense here -- or, excuse me, I guess not a defense because of the posture, but in this case -- there's not enough here to support by a preponderance of the evidence that the 320 plants for which they were charged were for their own personal use or for that of Ms. Moore. So I think that that argument fails just on its face.

And whether they were serving as primary caregivers to

Ms. Moore or not, it's irrelevant. What really would matter is
how many plants she needed. Let's assume that they were
serving as primary caregivers for her and they're growing for
her. We still don't know how many plants were reasonably
related to her medical need. Even if it was 99, we're still
not getting up to 327.

So I think based on all of that, I think the final piece -- and I'm happy to go through more of the collective arguments. I think the Court is probably very familiar with our brief, and I think we've just shown that there's just not enough evidence in the record to support the defendants' claims that they were operating in a nonprofit status, that the two collectives were closed-circuit collectives; and I think the testimony that we just heard from Mr. Tindell, it made very clear one thing. Someone has to have a seller's permit, and his testimony made clear that no one had a seller's permit at the time that we are discussing in 2012.

Finally, the Court has mentioned this already, I would just point to the other indicia of unlawfulness found here, and that is not my decision to say that it's indicia of unlawfulness. That's in the California AG guidelines. They specifically state -- and I think the Court in *Gentile* found this as well -- when you have an excessive amount of cash, firearms, other drug evidence found, all indicia of unlawful sales. And here, there was a phenomenal amount of cash found on the property. It was over \$400,000 packaged in a manner that I would argue is inconsistent with lawful sales of marijuana.

In addition --

THE COURT: Well, the defendants suggest the nature of the legitimate medical marijuana business is they don't have the luxury of operating with traditional financial institutions and the like who won't touch the business, as I understand it, or at least in 2012 didn't. So there is, perhaps, more of a prospect that cash will be utilized. But you seem to suggest that, I guess, it's both amount and the way it is wrapped?

I mean, if you have a lot of cash because you're otherwise obliged to have cash because the banks won't be open to you, you do want to not make the cash obvious if you're keeping it in your house because you could be subject to being robbed; right?

MS. GILBERT: That may be true. But, you know, then I

would say why is it not in a safe? Why is it wrapped in plastic and then black plastic on the --

THE COURT: I guess my question to you is: That is curious, but why is that indicative of -- how does that become indicative of improper conduct; the wrapping, for example?

MS. GILBERT: Well, I think the wrapping goes to the fact that that cash was meant to be concealed. And it's not just how it was wrapped, but it was the second batch of cash and this was around \$189,000 that was found welded inside of a trailer. That cash was clearly meant to be hidden. I think that that's clear from the photograph Your Honor can look at.

THE COURT: I guess, though, I don't see how that's all that different than putting it in a safe. It's a version of a safe. I mean, you're trying to keep it away in a secure area. I mean, I don't know. I'm not sure. I think if it is something from which we can make an inference, it's not a particularly strong inference, but --

MS. GILBERT: Well, that may be true, Your Honor, but I think that does, then, go to the fact that we have no records for what profit or not profit they were earning. Instead, we have a phenomenal amount of cash on hand. And so I think if you say that if they're arguing, "Oh, they can't use banks for our business," that's one thing; but then they're not doing what the AG guidelines make clear that they're required to do, which is to record their costs and prove here that they were

operating in nonprofit status.

THE COURT: Let me ask on the two defendants, and as Mr. Palazzo made reference to, there are some distinctions in the record between the two; and it appears that there's more evidence of transactional evidence, if you will, pertaining to Mr. Pisarski than to Mr. Moore. So why should Mr. Moore be swept into the sort of collective action, if you will?

MS. GILBERT: Well, I think it's because Mr. Moore admitted that he was part of the collective action. I mean --

THE COURT: So you're depending in part on the plea?

MS. GILBERT: In part on the plea, but also -- I mean,

let me go through it step by step.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GILBERT: So the first is they were charged with conspiracy. They both admitted to conspiracy. They admitted -- they both admitted to ownership of those 320 plants. They both admitted to ownership of -- or, excuse me -- they both agreed to forfeit all of the cash and firearms and everything. And there's no distinction in the factual basis here that they've both admitted to for their conduct.

Second, I think that we can attribute Mr. -- if they both said that "This marijuana was ours together" and Mr. Pisarski says "I intended to sell it to these collectives," I think you can't distinguish Mr. Moore from that statement because they're in on this endeavor together. They co-owned that property.

They both had indicia that they lived there. Mr. Moore has admitted that. You know, I don't think you can separate the two of them.

But I think even if you wanted to say, fine, only
Mr. Pisarski was part of the collective and Mr. Moore just
intended to grow it for himself, again the numbers don't add up
here. But I think that their conduct is attributed to each
other and that it's very clear from the nature of the
Plea Agreement.

I think I would also say just, you know, I'm not sure how this plays out at this moment, but the Presentence Reports have both been prepared in this case and revised. The defendants did not object to any of the facts in those reports but for one about Mr. Moore's fingerprint being on a bullet, and so I'm putting that to the side. That's not the basis for any argument here. But neither of them have objected to the description of what was found, what occurred, who owned what, who lived there, and I think the Court can just take that all under advisement.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other short --

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, just some short comments.

First of all, we also have the declaration of Ramrattan, which was for 99 plants, if there was excess cannabis, and the Government doesn't disagree that you can't tell. There was no

testimony or any contention that those plants could have been male, female, or unusable. So the 320 is not a static number.

I mean, so by the time it came to yield, we don't know what was going to happen.

And, you know, you're an umpire. You're calling balls and strikes here. We get the facts. It's not like the defendants are jumping up and down that they got arrested and then released by state custody, then got indicted by federal.

I mean, the facts are the facts, and the fact that we're all cabined by is that we had 320 undeveloped plants. So you can't go back now and say they needed to -- we needed to provide testimony five years later what we would have done had we decided to sell them at all and what those decisions would have been. That's not -- I don't think I'd have credibility with the Court if we presented a hypothetical factual situation of a hypothetical buyer that we don't know who it would have been now in July of 2017.

So that's why there was no testimony that they would have been compliant because the snippet of time we're dealing with is 320 undeveloped plants. So we're stuck with those plants.

And I think that the Court was correct in asking those questions. And I asked a critical question, you don't need a permit until you're going to sell something. And the AG guidelines are not laws. Those guidelines -- I was not kidding when I said it was Jerry Brown that wrote the guidelines in

1 | 2010. A lot's happened since then. These guidelines --

THE COURT: He's still there. No.

MR. RICHARDS: He's still there, but he's the governor. You never leave.

You know, he's been around so long, as an aside, when I used to play on the beach in Malibu, he was there with Linda Ronstadt when he was the first governor. I mean, it's like he never leaves.

THE COURT: I remember when I was in college, yeah.

MR. RICHARDS: So the issue is with respect to what we're dealing with in this case, is that we have a very liberal approach to growers and when -- these burdens -- a grower that's growing at his house doesn't need to be a, quote, "nonprofit grower." They just can't sell for profit. They can get reimbursed for their labor, their time, but we don't have a sale to argue. So the difficulty from the Defense is we don't have to set up a hypothetical strawman to show you that we're compliant. All you have is a guy that's growing at his house and there was some cash.

Now, I will tell you, Judge, it is stupid to leave money in a safe. I will tell you I never would have a safe in my house. It's very dangerous. People put a gun to your head and say, "Open the safe." The first thing they do is go to the master bedroom and take the safe, throw it off the second story, put it in a car and leave. Hiding money like in

clothes, in a trailer, that's a smart place to hide it because no one is going to look for it.

So if you do have cash or jewelry or something, you would never want to leave it, and he's out in the sticks, in a safe that says "Valuables inside." So that's not normal.

And I think that, again, we never presented Mr. Pisarski as someone that was only growing marijuana. The tax representations, you know, we phoned the business to get those exact numbers for those five years. That's why I'm comfortable with him putting it under oath that that's the taxes that were paid.

And he had a legitimate business that made money. The marijuana that was being grown, there is no evidence that that was his only business or that was how -- his primary source of income. And it takes 12 pounds, you know, to make one pound of oil, and there was evidence in the record that they found, you know, processing. A lot of people like to smoke the stuff in vapor or put it in edibles, and so it's really we're all engaging in speculation what could have happened to that.

And so when we provided the collective evidence, it was simply to show that there's two ways he has strict compliance. I know the Government -- and, by the way, in the *Gentile* case, that was a dispensary case and the name of the dispensary was A&P Medicinal Cooperative in Bakersfield, and so they had evidence of all these sales. See, that's a business.

And you run into more problems I mean, just before they
made it legal, it was very difficult as a state practitioner to
defend over-the-counter marijuana sales because the state
police would come in. And, you know, it's very hard to run an
all-cash business with and, by the way, the irony, Judge, is
in those businesses, there's at least five guys with large
weapons at the door on the street with flack jackets and armed
security. I mean, you'd laugh if you ever went to Venice
Boulevard in L.A. and seen some of these dispensaries. It
looks like you're going into, like, a Central American bank.
You know, there's large capacity rifles everywhere. And so
and because they're targets for robberies.

And so these stores did run into problems, and you wouldn't be defending those for compliance because they always ran into problems, you know, if they didn't have issues.

But these growers, the law, it's true, that if you're just growing in your house and you haven't done anything yet, there's not a lot of regulations, but I'm not suggesting that there are no regulations. We're only suggesting in the narrow snapshot that you've been evaluating, nothing had happened yet.

And the admissions in the Plea Agreement all dealt with intent because those are federal crimes, but now we're looking at if we do a reset and pretend -- see, the other thing is, you know, in the -- I can't pronounce the name but in, like, the Sissel -- it's like that long name that the Ninth Circuit

reversed all those convictions and sent the case back for 1 remand, the Silla -- it's like -- it's another McIntosh -- it's 2 a post-McIntosh case. But what -- in that case those people 3 had already been sentenced, and they sent it back to the 4 5 Ninth Circuit -- the Ninth Circuit sent it back to start over with McIntosh. 6 So the fact that there's a Plea Agreement is not ipso 7 facto outcome determinative. What's determinative is if you 8 take aside the Plea Agreement still recognizing the admissions, 9 was the conduct at issue in strict compliance with state --10 11 THE COURT: Am I right in understanding your argument as being you think there's great significance to the fact that 12 the criminal charge is not charging a completed transaction but 13 is charging possession with intent to sell? Do you think 14 15 that's the critical distinction here on applying the McIntosh 16 standard? 17 MR. RICHARDS: You mean for the purposes of state law 18 or federal law? THE COURT: I'm saying if they had -- if a sale had --19 20 if this was a buy/bust, or something like that, and they had 21 charged this as a sale of marijuana, you think you wouldn't 22 have any of these arguments? 23 MR. RICHARDS: No, I wouldn't. 24 **THE COURT:** Okay. 25 MR. RICHARDS: No. Because -- I'm going to give No.

1 you that case.

THE COURT: I think I know what you're talking about and I've got it in the papers. I mean, it was cited to me, so don't worry about it. You don't have to find it.

MR. RICHARDS: Oh, okay. Yeah.

THE COURT: I'll find it.

MR. RICHARDS: I don't personally think that the -- I don't personally think that in a federal case where if this was a case where they were charged with -- where the facts were they were distributing it like a storefront, those are harder facts.

I mean, and what Mr. Palazzo said, you know, with respect to these cases where you have 10,000 plants, 30,000 plants, I feel sorry for the defender that's going to have to come in and say, "You know, they're in compliance," because those make it more complicated unless it's a large collective.

But at the end of the day, the things that he found in his house were not shocking compared to things that you would find in a home. This was a home marijuana grow. It wasn't like on some commercial operation where the operation was separated in a different area.

Oh, here's the case that was driving me nuts. It's S-I-L-K-E-U-T-S-A-B-A-Y, *Silkeutsabay*. That's at 678 Fed. Appendix 608. And so the Ninth Circuit remanded those even though they were sentenced.

So what I'm saying is, you can't penalize them because we resolved the case with a federal component, but the relevant charge, as I said earlier, was 11358 of the Health and Safety Code. That's a straightforward cultivation. I mean, there would be no other charge you could charge them with yet because there's no indicia of anything at this point. You don't have even a usable marijuana. So --

THE COURT: You don't honestly contend, though -that's Exhibit A -- that that's just a home marijuana grow.

That's a little more extensive than a mom-and-pop backyard grow some marijuana.

MR. RICHARDS: Well, it would be in San Francisco or, you know, in downtown Los Angeles; but, see, the difference is, Judge, if you live in Humboldt County and you have 410 acres, I just want -- I mean, we've just got to look at who we're dealing with. It's a young guy. You know, there's wild animals, bears. You know, you're in a very rural area on 410 acres. So on a little snippet of that in a greenhouse he's growing 300 plants.

No, you're right, it's not one person growing marijuana for themselves in an indoor grow; but, look --

THE COURT: Okay. I hear you. We have a lot of cases from Humboldt, so I understand this.

MR. RICHARDS: Look, I'll tell you something on just a good example. Like, before I moved houses, I didn't have any

land at all, but then I moved and I had, like, an empty plot. 1 It was, like, half an acre. So instead of planting one lime 2 tree, I planted 20. I never am going to need 20 but because I 3 had so many extra spaces, it just lined up nicely.

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Like, if you have the extra space, if they're going to grow and there's three people there, it's not a big stretch when you lose a lot of plants to mold and they're not all usable to grow 300 plants. It's just not a lot when right up the street they were investigating 10,000 plants. I mean, as you said, from Humboldt County.

And these other cases in the pipelines that deal with growers, this is the smallest amount of plants. Most of these cases are 10- to 30,000 plants. I mean, they're huge operations. This wasn't that type of operation. I mean, you didn't see fields of people working. And so I would just say that if we cabin this, that they meet the medical requirement and they deserve the immunity.

And when the Ninth Circuit said "strict compliance," unfortunately, you know, they left it up to the District Courts to figure out the procedure and everything else. And I watched the oral argument. When I was watching it, I thought of you and I said, "Judge Seeborg is not going to be happy when they're saying, 'Oh, the District Courts will figure all this out, '" because I thought that, you know, it seems like they're just dumping a mess to get it all back again and have all the

cases related.

But I don't think the goal is that -- in our case where we did present a preponderance of the evidence, I don't think the goal is not to give -- is not to stay the proceeding. I mean, it's not like in five years they're coming in here five years later, you're not seeing, "Hey, you know, look at all these wiretaps now we've got on Pisarski"; or we had the hearing today, you didn't see one witness from the Government to say, "Hey, I bought a lot of dope from Pisarski."

In *Gentile* they had methamphetamine in the store. I mean, they were doing stuff that wasn't your typical. I mean, in five years of investigation these guys have been on pretrial, you don't see one other piece of evidence uncovered that suggests that Pisarski was a big player or illegally selling marijuana, and I think that's important. I mean, they've had five years.

THE COURT: It may be of consequence at a certain point in this case, but as you understand well, I don't make the charging decisions. Hypothetically I could agree with you that why is the Government pursuing this case. Legitimate question, but it is not for me. I don't have a basis to say I would have made a different charging decision when I was in the U.S. Attorney's Office. That doesn't translate into I'd just dismiss the case. I can't do that.

MR. RICHARDS: No, but --

THE COURT: So I have it, it's mine to deal with, and one can argue whether or not it's a good use of prosecutorial resources but that's sort of an academic discussion. It doesn't really play into this, does it?

and I had counsel re-send us all the discovery again last night to just -- I mean, I guess -- and so I wanted to make sure I wasn't missing anything so I started getting a lot of discovery last night but it was just the same discovery in these new records. The search doesn't reveal anything but construction and it doesn't reveal anything that would support the contention that there is sales that are -- that this 327 plants are tied to or that there's some large-scale business going on.

I mean, I'm just saying if there was a witness or somebody that was going to contradict or shed some light on this 327 plants, you don't have that. There's no cooperator. There's no other person that says something different. And, I mean, we've had a long time to investigate this case, and the best the Government has is someone doesn't remember signing an agreement and we've withdrawn that evidence.

And I just think that strict compliance, the standard that the Government has raised in their papers would be met by no state defendants. I think the Court has to take a realistic look on what's the thrust of the law in the state of California. Is it to force people that get notes or that go

through the rigmarole of collective action so they can grow a medicine that's illegal under federal law, is the thrust to make them go through large hula hoops to get immunity? It's not.

And even though we have a difference of opinion on the burden, and you could see how easy the burden is under state court. Asserting an affirmative defense is not an insurmountable burden. It's preponderance of the evidence.

I mean, they're not suggesting -- I mean, presumably they could have checked those recommendations, presumably they could be making these arguments; but what they tactically did in their opposition was to try to drag us into the tax issue, to the business issue, but there's nothing to do yet, and that's a fact that they can't escape.

And that for your analysis it shouldn't be on, "Well, I'm going to find they weren't strictly compliant because had we advanced the ball six months, there's no way they could have complied." That's not fair because that's not the deck that you were dealt. The deck that we're asserting is simply, hey, the guy was growing marijuana. He had a note. He wasn't going to get arrested. And if he was going to do something more with excess cannabis, then he needed to maybe get some additional documents, like a resale number, which is the easiest thing in the world to get.

I mean, and even though the Court would want him to be in

compliance with all aspects, the code doesn't say in the code you have to have a resale number, and there's no evidence they didn't have a resale number when they would have sold this marijuana. I mean, we don't know.

And so that's why I don't think -- you can't convict someone -- it's not once a thief, always a thief. If their position is, "Well, we sought evidence," or, "We think they used to sell marijuana," that's -- you don't get arrested for what you used to do. Marijuana is a controlled substance.

Possession is a continuing offense. So if you're cultivating, it's only the cultivation at the site that day. It's not -- you can't arrest somebody because they cultivated three years ago.

And so that's -- I know this sounds like a lot of lawyering and wordsmithing but, I mean, if we're going to be very technical and hold them to all these things, they deserve the benefit. And when Mr. Palazzo was talking about lenity, the rule of lenity is not only at sentencing, it's if a statute has two different interpretations.

THE COURT: That's true. That's true.

MR. RICHARDS: And I'm saying in a close case -- let's just say this is a close case. The close case should go to the defendant --

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. RICHARDS: -- because you could see from listening

to this agent, these laws were all over the place and in every
case they talk about the patchwork. I mean, it's very
confusing.

But at the end of the day, I would ask the Court to only apply laws enacted by the state legislature and apply California case law and say, "If I was sitting across the street in the state criminal court, would I find that this guy made a showing to get a jury instruction to the jury?"

THE COURT: Of course, though, that's not the standard. I don't want to start again, but it's not the standard. You can argue why it should be the standard, but the standard at the moment in <code>McIntosh</code> is preponderance of the evidence on your burden, and you say you've met it; and I understand that --

MR. RICHARDS: Right.

THE COURT: -- but I can't slide back into the standard being would it work in a state criminal prosecution.

MR. RICHARDS: Well, this is a federal -- this is a criminal prosecution. But I don't want the record to suggest that I think McIntosh said the defendant has to provide an affirmative defense. I think McIntosh said apply state law and then the Government in their brilliant think tank started saying, "It's an injunction. It's like an injunction, so the burden of proof is on the defendant."

Because their first brief to you when I saw it, I said,

"Oh, my God. They're going to try to argue a different standard than state law," which is I understand that you're following it, but I'm letting you know that the opinion doesn't say the defendant must present an affirmative defense and actually it doesn't tell you what standard.

THE COURT: No, but it pretty clearly says by a preponderance -- that the defendant has to show by a preponderance of the evidence strict compliance with the state law, and that's what it says. I mean, it's -- you know, we can -- anyway.

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, and my narrow nuance of that is is I think that once we show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is compliance and then you apply state law, state law says then the burden shifts to the Government to prove lack of compliance.

And so that -- see, I never thought we were saying different things. I always agreed that the defendant has the burden of producing the facts to show that they have the defense, but that burden is not a high burden. Once that burden is there, then under state law --

THE COURT: That's not, in my mind -- and I don't want to get too deeply into this -- that's not the same as preponderance of the evidence. That's your burden going forward to then shift the burden back to the other side.

That's sort of a prima facie type of burden, and reasonable

minds can argue whether or not that ought to be what it is, but

I don't think -- we can agree to disagree -- I don't think

that's what McIntosh says. Now, maybe McIntosh wasn't right,

but it's right for my world.

MR. RICHARDS: I agree with that.

THE COURT: So, you know -- but we may disagree on exactly what it says. But, in any event, I think we've been over this ground.

MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. If it's close, I would just say that absent some -- I would just leave you with this: It's not like a hard hill to climb. It's a hill but, I mean, you have -- for these plants, you're blessed with the fact that you have them as you have them, and you have people living in the house that all have notes, and you have Sakina Ramrattan that also had a note. I mean, you don't have -- it doesn't have to be that complex.

And I understand the prosecutorial motive to say, "Well, if they had a business, they needed this." But they can't make my client an elephant when he's really a lion. You can't really do that. I mean, we are -- the facts are what they were, and there's nothing wrong, when we thought about what are we going to present to you, to say we're just going to deal with the marijuana at issue that's illegal under federal law. I mean, that's all we're going to do. They weren't charged with other conduct.

I mean, the guidelines, the Plea Agreement, the only controlled substance we stipulated to was that marijuana. And so when we were analyzing, we thought we would just come to you with a straightforward, circumscribed presentation on that date only, and that's -- the chips fall where they fall.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RICHARDS: All right.

MR. PALAZZO: Your Honor, very quickly, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PALAZZO: And I promise I'm not going to test your patience. I will be quick. I just wanted to say a couple things.

With respect to the desired imposition of the AG guidelines, that is not state law. You have mentioned *McIntosh* numerous times. You said strict compliance with state law. AG guidelines are not state law.

Secondly, with respect to the statement and assertion that there's been no evidence adduced with respect to profit-making motive, the declaration that Mr. Moore provided to the Court in his initial briefing was at paragraph 6 he said, with respect to that grow (reading):

"I did not receive any profit nor did I expect to receive any profit from the disposition of the plants." The 300 plants on July 10th, 2012.

And then I also wanted to mention in response that -- I

think, two things. The relevant imposition and rubric of demonstrating compliance with state law may not necessarily just exist on July 10th, 2012, especially if there was a potential of sale to the collective by Mr. Pisarski down the road in October, November, what have you.

So as the testimony revealed, there would be no requirement to get that permit, that resale permit, until that time and that occurrence happened.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. PALAZZO: With respect to the tracking of expenses, there were, indeed, expenses listed that were seized of construction and so forth. And just because they don't have the universe of documents related to a particular grow and how much was spent in terms of fertilizer and whatever have you, that doesn't mean they didn't exist or they couldn't then recapitulate those expenses for purposes of determining, you know, whether or not they're making a profit when they go to sell and get reimbursed their overhead and their operational expenses as it relates to Mr. Pisarski from the collective.

So just because they don't find certain documents doesn't mean they don't exist or they won't exist at some point in the future.

THE COURT: Don't you have to come forward with them now because you have the burden of showing it wasn't for profit?

MR. PALAZZO: No, because there was no sale. There was no sale that occurred with regard to those plants.

Lastly, some of the language that you were honing in on with respect to the admissions, you know, I just wanted to highlight that I don't see it being as problematic, especially when you consider -- you were sort of focusing in on the forfeiture language, which was --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PALAZZO: -- that both defendants admitted that all the property subject to forfeiture, quote, "was derived from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the violation identified above and/or," so you have a disjunctive there --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. PALAZZO: -- "was used or intended to be used, in any manner or in any part, to commit," again "or" as a disjunctive, "to facilitate the commission of the violation."

So just because there's money that might exist there and part of that is being subject to forfeiture, there's nothing that it can't be harmonized with respect to, yeah, money was being used for purposes of expending that money for buying certain things to create the grow and then ultimately to potentially, if it materialized, sell part of that to recoup expenses.

So there's really nothing that is incongruous in terms of

the language that's been cited, especially with all those disjunctives and then the manner or in part. That kind of covers -- depending on how you want to construe it, that covers the conduct, and it's not inconsistent with what we're contending today.

And then, lastly, if you look at Exhibit F, you know, it almost looks like this -- you know, this is sort of people that are in a remote rural area that are almost preparing for the doomsday scenario with all of this canning, all these jars containing all this food, and the manner in which it's stored. So it kind of struck me that some of the other conduct is not necessarily uncharacteristic of that kind of a mentality, so to speak.

And the final thing I want to say is I just want to make sure that the exhibits that we tendered to the Court are, indeed, admitted with the exception of those two cultivation agreements. Am I correct?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. PALAZZO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate it.

MS. GILBERT: The Government has nothing further.

THE COURT: Okay. We're about to close out. I have one more question for you, and I don't mean this question to open up the whole discussion again.

But you had said at one point when you were talking about

	PROCEEDINGS
1	the charge and you were talking about beginning in 2010 and
2	continuing on and talking about the admission in the
3	Plea Agreement that effectively admitted to some conduct,
4	conspiratorial type, but when the Defense says that the focus
5	for purposes of the rider should be on, effectively, the 320
6	plants, do you disagree with that?
7	MS. GILBERT: I think McIntosh said conduct, if I
8	recall. And I would want to take a quick look, but I think
9	what I think is look to McIntosh. McIntosh said did they
10	strictly comply with California law.
11	And I think we have to look at whether they complied at
12	the time of the charge, but the charge begins before July 10th
13	of 2012. But I don't think you can just I think that I'm
14	not you know, I don't think we need to prove that the sales
15	that they made in 2010 or 2011 I don't think they need to
16	prove, excuse me, that the sales they made in 2010 or 2011 were
17	compliant with state law. It really is regarding the federal

Because if their conduct at the time of the charge was compliant, then we can't prosecute -- we cannot continue to prosecute them for the Indictment that's before the Court.

charge.

THE COURT: Well, you're stayed from doing it.

MS. GILBERT: Correct. We're stayed from expending any funds is I think the best interpretation of McIntosh.

And so then the question is the only -- under McIntosh,

- the only -- the defendants can only get that stay if they show
 that they were strictly compliant with all of state law, and I
 think that -- I don't think that that -- I don't think McIntosh
 limits you.
 - THE COURT: In other words, another way to ask this question is --
 - **MS. GILBERT:** Yeah.

THE COURT: -- if I conclude that what they've admitted to is they were engaged in a marijuana business that was illegal from the federal perspective from 2010 onward, are you saying that ends the question or not?

Because they are more or less pointing out to me, many times now, that the admissions really are -- they're suggesting they're not backing away from the admissions, not suggesting I can't take them into account, but simply saying all they admitted to was, yes, they were engaging in -- from 2010 onward, their conduct was violative of federal law, but that doesn't mean that you go back to 2010 on the compliance question with state law.

When you're looking at that question, you're looking at the 320 plants, 327 or whatever, on the date of the -- and that's what I'm trying to drill down to and to get your view on it. I don't know if you even understand the question.

MS. GILBERT: No, I understand -- no, I think I do understand what you're saying.

I do think that the best reading of *McIntosh* is that we look to their conduct that is the basis of the charge, and the basis of the charge is the 320 plants. So, I mean, I agree with the Court. I think that that is the best reading of the law.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. Let me ask, in terms of going forward, it seems to me -- I just want to get a confirmation of this -- that there are certain avenues that we will ride down depending upon what I decide. And I'm not going to decide it right now. I'm going to take it back and review all this. It was an interesting argument.

If the decision is that the Defense has not carried its burden, then the next question, if I'm not mistaken, becomes --well, at one point there was a motion to withdraw the plea. That is technically administratively not out there, but that would be subject to being revived by the defendants.

So that's one avenue, is that correct, that it would be -if the decision of the Court is favorable to the Government on
this particular motion, the next thing that would have to be
adjudicated is potentially a motion to withdraw the plea?

MR. RICHARDS: Yes, but depending on my next point, I have one question before that that would change that, make that moot. So can I just ask you that question?

THE COURT: Yeah.

Okay. As the Court can appreciate, 1 MR. RICHARDS: we're dealing with serious charges, you know, felony charges --2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. RICHARDS: -- and the law is, like, moving around 4 5 very quickly. And then the Congress -- I didn't even put this time, you know, the unbelievable amount of bills going through 6 Congress dealing with stuff just like that. I didn't want to 7 burden you with that, but my intention is that if you -- if the 8 Court denied this motion, the first -- my first request would 9 10 be, of course, is we would want to seek relief or review like 11 the other defendants have done and that they did in McIntosh and they've done since McIntosh because, one, to be honest with 12 everybody, you know, in another year Congress may say this is 13 not a controlled substance anymore, and that will be a whole 14 15 nother series of issues. So I don't -- I'm not in a rush to run my client to the guillotine. 16 17 THE COURT: No, you don't need to dance around it. From your perspective, time is on your side, and I understand 18 19 that. 20 MR. RICHARDS: Well, legitimately. I'm not delaying 21 for the purpose of delaying. I mean, there is -- you know, I never thought in my career I'd see five states already --22 23 THE COURT: We don't -- I agree with you. understand that --24 25 MR. RICHARDS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and you don't need to justify why 1 time-wise it is -- you perceive a benefit, and that's perfectly 2 fair. 3 But, okay. So you would be seeking review at that point. 4 5 MR. RICHARDS: With your permission. **THE COURT:** Well, but then the question is: Seeking a 6 7 stay and then -- okay. MR. RICHARDS: In McIntosh they gave interlocutory 8 review. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So that answers part of my 10 11 question. So, in other words, where we would be in the event I said no to the stay would be a request for a further stay for 12 purposes of appellate review as opposed to adjudicating the 13 motion to withdraw the plea. 14 15 MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Now, if I deny the motion -- I mean, if I grant the motion, what that does is, if I understand 17 18 it correctly, takes us to September, and then we have to reassess because the rider only goes through September of 2017; 19 20 right? MR. RICHARDS: Right. But in September if they 21 22 extended the rider -- and I will represent that the Senate 23 committee rejected the AG's request to not put the rider in I don't know if you know that, but they said, "No, 24

we're not listening to you. We're going to keep the rider."

25

Although, the one thing we can all agree 1 THE COURT: on is there's zero point to speculating on what will happen. I 2 mean, that's interesting, but I wouldn't take that to the bank. 3 Who knows what's going to happen? 4 5 MR. RICHARDS: I wouldn't, but I will tell the Court that there's a tremendous amount of interest politically and 6 it's an expanding interest --7 THE COURT: Sure. 8 MR. RICHARDS: -- that states can make their own laws 9 related to this stuff and that the federal government is moving 10 11 I just see the trend. It's a fair statement that --THE COURT: You've got that trend, and then you've got 12 13 a Department of Justice that is perhaps going a different direction as of today, but who knows. 14 MR. RICHARDS: Maybe. Did something -- I didn't check 15 16 the news. 17 THE COURT: I haven't looked at the news today. MR. RICHARDS: But the other -- yeah, so what I'm 18 saying is, if it is extended in September, I would start asking 19 20 the Government to dismiss based on potential speedy trial or 21 other issues. That's what they suggested, that the stay shouldn't be forever, but I wouldn't -- I would agree -- I 22 23 wouldn't want to play -- I'd want to give them the same courtesy that if in September the rider was gone, then I 24 25 wouldn't expect them to honor it anymore and I wouldn't be

crying foul and I would just, you know. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. RICHARDS: But I think maybe you might want to --3 I mean, it's already late July. September is coming pretty 4 5 quickly. I mean, you did one time in May say, "Hey, let's see what happens." I mean, I think that you would feel better 6 if -- I mean, like you said at the onset, "Hey, if they 7 withdraw the rider, we don't need to go through this exercise"; 8 but, I mean, we are coming up on the end of the rider. 9 MS. GILBERT: Unless there's a continuing 10 11 appropriation. Who knows; right? We never know. Right. 12 THE COURT: 13 MR. RICHARDS: And maybe they'll pass a real law that doesn't have, like, this sort of, you know, "I want to touch it 14 15 but it's not cold." I mean, they may just pass a law that 16 says, you know, that we're going to -- like California did, all 17 pending matters go to misdemeanors or, you know, whatever. 18 But, I mean, the rider is an unusual way to --THE COURT: Yes. Whatever one may think of the intent 19 20 behind it, this is not a very workable situation they've left 21 us with for anybody, for Prosecution, for the Defense. doesn't work very well --22 23 MR. RICHARDS: Right. THE COURT: -- but that's -- it's not our -- we're 24 stuck with what we're stuck with. 25

So, okay. That answers my question. I now kind of -- I understand the scenario.

The one thing, then, that is unlikely to be in the immediate future whatever, even if I go that route, the motion -- the reason I'm asking this question is I looked back at the docket and at one point you had made a motion to withdraw the plea, and that actually is, just to tell you, it's now closed on the court's record. So there is no pending motion to that end, and you're fine with that?

MR. RICHARDS: As long as the Court doesn't think I'm not deleterious in making it. The only reason why I was going to make it is if you weren't going to grant a McIntosh hearing. Then McIntosh came out, and then -- that was only if I couldn't get the hearing. You granted the hearing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RICHARDS: But I don't want the record to reflect we're playing fast and loose with the withdrawal. The withdrawal was a stopgap issue because if he couldn't get the hearing, I felt he was entitled to it and the circumstances had changed.

But there is case law that says you have to, you know, move diligently to withdraw a plea, but we don't really want to withdraw the plea in the sense that we would like to just have the case stayed. If the rider goes away and there is no more rider, I'll represent to the Court and to my colleague that I

think we'll just go through with the sentencing. 1 I didn't create the rider. The day of the sentencing when 2 the president said he was going to sign this rider, you were 3 kind enough and my prior colleague, Adam --4 5 MS. GILBERT: Wright. MR. RICHARDS: -- Wright, who's a great guy, said, 6 "I'm not going to make you go forward in case this creates some 7 law, " and then we had to wait a year for the Ninth Circuit to 8 make the law. 9 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. RICHARDS: But that's why we stayed it, because I had an excellent, ethical prosecutor that was very conscious 12 about not making someone plead to something and then a month 13 later it becomes -- they have a defense. And so he was very 14 15 decent in that regard and so were you. THE COURT: I remember we got very close because I had 16 17 the PSR. I had my sentencing notes all ready. 18 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. Okay. And Ms. Gilbert has come in late in 19 THE COURT: 20 the game, so at this rate Ms. Vartain's son will then be in 21 college. 22 (Laughter) 23 Exactly. Exactly. MS. GILBERT: THE COURT: All right. Very good. Well, I will take 24 it under submission and go through all this. It was very 25

1	helpful. Thank you very much.
2	MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
3	MR. PALAZZO: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	MS. GILBERT: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	(Proceedings adjourned at 2:09 p.m.)
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8	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
9	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
10	from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
11	
12	DATE: Thursday, August 24, 2017
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17	Jo Ann Bryce, CSR No. 3321, RMR, CRR, FCRR U.S. Court Reporter
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