Archive for the ‘Blog’ Category

Who really is LA’s Chief Prosecutor? Is that even a title?

Sunday, March 25th, 2012

Recently a dispute arose surrounding acting City Attorney Carmen Trutanich’s ballot designation. The lawsuit by candidate Alan Jackson seeks to prevent L.A. City Atty. Carmen Trutanich from calling himself “chief prosecutor” or “chief criminal prosecutor” on the June ballot.

Candidate Alan Jackson

City Attorney Carmen Trutanich

First, it is disturbing that this is the same City Attorney who promised he would serve out his term before running for higher office whose character is now being questioned in another ethical scandal.  Attorneys have a duty of candor with the Court, but one who runs for office needs to be straight with the voters, mostly non- lawyers, and not engage in conduct that is clearly designed to make them something they are not.

I have lived in the County of Los Angeles my entire life.  Los Angeles County is not the City of Los Angeles.  According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the county had a population of 9,818,605, making it the most populous county in the United States. Los Angeles County alone is more populous than 42 individual U.S. states. The county seat is the city of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles County also includes two offshore islands; San Clemente Island and Santa Catalina Island. The county is home to 88 incorporated cities and many unincorporated areas. At 4,083 square miles, it is larger than the combined areas of the states of Rhode Island and Delaware. The county is home to over a quarter of all California residents. One of the most diverse counties in the country, Los Angeles, is home to the nation’s largest urban Native American population

Enough of the geographic facts, it is obvious that the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles has a completely different role, both in the scope of prosecutorial discretion, budget, staff, and geographic territory.

The City Attorney is not the “chief prosecutor” for Los Angeles.  Obviously, how can he be?   It is in fact insulting and presumptuous to run for District Attorney and claim you are presently the “chief prosecutor” for Los Angeles without clarifying what City are the chief prosecutor for.  It is insulting to the other 87 City Prosecutors around the County.

For background;

In General.

“The district attorney is the public prosecutor, except as otherwise provided by law.” (Govt. Code § 26500; see Penal Code § 691, subd. (d) [“prosecuting attorney” includes district attorney, city attorney, city prosecutor, prosecuting attorney, or any other title, having right or duty to prosecute any charge of a public offense]; People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 588, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, [discussing powers and required impartiality of district attorney]; 28 Cal. Western L. Rev. 1 [rise of urban public prosecutor]; 108 Harv. L. Rev. 775 [ability of prosecutors to subpoena defense attorneys].)

The district attorney does the following:

(a) Arrest Proceedings.

He institutes proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably suspected of public offenses. (Govt. Code § 26501; see Taliaferro v. Locke (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 752, 755, 6 Cal.Rptr. 813.)

(b) Grand Jury.

He attends grand jury sessions and advises the jurors on cases presented for their consideration. (Govt. Code § 26501; Penal Code § 935.)

(c) Accusatory Pleadings.

He draws all indictments and informations.  (Govt. Code § 26502; see People v. Coleman (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 812, 817, 189 P.2d 845.)

(d) Criminal Prosecutions.

The institution of a criminal proceeding must be authorized and approved by the district attorney. (People v. Municipal Court (Pellegrino) (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206, 103 Cal.Rptr. 645.) He conducts “all prosecutions for public offenses.” (Govt. Code § 26500; see Penal Code § 1256 [duty to assist Attorney General in criminal appeals]; Penal Code § 4703 [district attorney may transfer responsibility to Attorney General for prosecution of crimes committed by prisoners in state prison]; People v. Daggett (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5, 253 Cal.Rptr. 195 [Govt. Code § 26500 does not require district attorney to be present at infraction trials]; 10 A.L.R.4th 605 [disciplinary action against attorney for misconduct while prosecuting attorney]; on authority to associate private counsel, see People v. Calkins (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 251, 254, 47 P.2d 544; on appointment of special prosecutors, see 84 A.L.R.3d 29 [political or controversial prosecutions]; 84 A.L.R.3d 115 [where regular prosecutor charged with, or investigated for, criminal or impeachable offense].)

Beverly Hills and West Hollywood do not have City Charters.  They are general law cities.   However, Los Angeles does.  A city by charter may create the office of “city prosecutor,” or provide that a deputy city attorney shall act as such, for prosecution of all misdemeanors within the city. (Govt. Code § 72193; see also Govt. Code § 41803.5, subd. (a) [city attorney, with consent of district attorney, may prosecute “any misdemeanor committed within the city arising out of violation of state law”].)

Government Code section 41803.5 states,

a) With the consent of the district attorney of the county, the city attorney of any general law city or chartered city within the county may prosecute any misdemeanor committed within the city arising out of violation of state law. This section shall not be deemed to affect any of the provisions of Section 72193.
The District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles prosecutes all misdemeanor violations of State law in Beverly Hills and West Hollywood, and other general law cites.  Carmen Trutanich does not share concurrent jurisdiction.   The title of Chief Prosecutor is without any office sanction by the County of Los Angeles and Steve Cooley.  It is highly problematic.  Furthermore, it is an unfair business practice to other attorneys.  Finally, a district attorney is precluded from engaging in private practice in Los Angeles County.  A city attorney cannot claim they are a chief prosecutor.  There is no such thing.

If the words chief prosecutor had to be used to describe a particular person, that person could only be Steve Cooley, not Carmen Trutanich.

Attorneys are bound to different standards.  Some concepts apply here.  Business and Profession’s Code 6157.1 dealing with Advertisements—False, Misleading or Deceptive, states,

“No advertisement shall contain any false, misleading, or deceptive statement or omit to state any fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which they are made, not false, misleading, or deceptive.”

“It is settled that concealment of material facts is just as misleading as explicit false statements, and accordingly, is misconduct calling for discipline.” [Di Sabatino v. State Bar (1980) 27 C3d 159, 162–163, 162 CR 458, 459–460—misleading bail commissioner by failing to disclose 2 prior bail reduction motions; Best v. State Bar (1962) 57 C2d 633, 21 CR 589, 591–592—attorney disbarred for improper solicitation and lying to federal judge; Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 CA4th 1441, 1457, 45 CR2d 695, 706, fn. 16—lawyer criticized for lack of candor under CRPC 5–200 for failing to apprise court of existing stay order lawyer believed was invalid]

Obviously, the tactic of falsely labeling yourself in an election does not warrant disbarment or disciplinary proceedings, but it does create an ethical issue.  If anything, the District Attorney should error on the said of clarity, straightforwardness, and truthfulness.  Calling yourself a title that no one uses is clearly misleading to the average non-lawyer and would not pass muster in a courtroom in front of a jury.  It should not be tolerated or ignored in an election for the County’s highest and largest prosecutorial post.  We as attorneys can see right through Mr. Trutanich’s false embracing of titles that are non-existent, but the average voter unfortunately would not.

I am surprised at the apathy of the other candidates running in this election and I am glad that someone has brought this to the public’s attention.

Daily Journal Article, March 13, 2012

Tuesday, March 13th, 2012

This article was published today in the Daily Journal, the premier legal newspaper in California.  The reporter did a great job. 

A pdf copy is available here:  PDF Copy:DJ Eviction Article

Rare eviction ruling gains attention

In an apparent case of first impression, bank is told its eviction

policy was illegal.

By Jason W. Armstrong

In an apparently unprecedented case in California, a judge turned down a mortgage

company’s attempt to evict a nonpaying tenant from a Los Angeles home because it

flouted a federal law requiring new owners of foreclosed properties to give such tenants

90 days’ notice before eviction.

After Private National Mortgage Acceptance Company LLC bought the owner’s

property at a foreclosure sale, the company served renter K.S. a “3 day pay

rent or quit notice,” contending she’d stopped paying her $2,500 monthly term.

But in a decision last week, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Lawrence H.

Cho granted the tenants’s motion to quash the eviction complaint, finding the bank failed to

give her a 90-day “notice to quit” under the 3-year-old Protecting Tenants at

Foreclosure Act. The judge ruled that Private National’s failure barred it from booting

her – even though she’d racked up $22,500 in back rent after not paying for nearly a

year. PNMAC Mortgage Co. LLC v. S….O, 11U04495 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.,

filed 2011).

Real estate lawyers said the case could make lenders and other purchasers of

foreclosed properties reassess their eviction policies when dealing with tenants living in

such homes. The issue has heated up in the midst of the real estate downturn and has

triggered recent state legislation, including statutes addressing premature service of

unlawful detainers on renters in foreclosures.

In his ruling, Cho said the issues in the case appeared to be legally untested “without

controlling caselaw for either side.” According to legal observers, such detailed court

decisions analyzing statutes involving eviction matters are few and far between because

judges handling such cases usually have packed calendars, and most unlawful-detainer

tenants don’t have lawyers.

“The fact that Judge Cho published a written opinion about this issue shows he

knows he’ll see this issue coming up again in the future,” said Ronald Richards,

S—–O (tenant) lawyer. “The Legislature has given tenants broad protection, and the bank here

tried to circumvent that.”

Richards is a partner with The Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates APC.

It wasn’t clear whether the bank would challenge the ruling. Deborah Bass, an

attorney representing Private National, couldn’t be reached for comment Monday. Bass

is a partner with The Law Offices of Deborah Bass APC.

In a Feb. 27 hearing in the case, the judge and lawyers for both sides grappled with

whether the bank was legally permitted to step into the landlord’s shoes upon

foreclosure for the purposes of evicting for past due rent. Private National’s lawyers

argued that it could enforce the Tenant’s lease post-foreclosure and had the power to evict

her for nonpayment. The bank’s attorneys contended the federal 90-day notice

requirement applied only when a foreclosing party sought to evict based on eviction

alone, not on a failure-to-pay-rent theory.

“There’s never been one penny of rent paid to our client, who has right of

______________________________________________

‘No matter what rights or ‘interest’ the

foreclosing party assumes (including the right

to evict for non-payment of rent), it cannot

evict without providing the minimum 90 day

notice to bona fide tenants.’ – Judge Lawrence

H. Cho

______________________________________________

possession,” Paul Tauger, co-counsel for the lender, told Cho in the hearing,

according to a transcript. “We’re the landlord by operation of the law, which means we

have a right to collect rent.”

Richards disagreed.

“According to counsel, landlords – or owners that buy at a foreclosed sale can say,

‘Oh, you’re a tenant. Okay. I’m going to – you didn’t pay the 2,000 dollars this month.

I’m now going to serve a three-day notice,” the attorney told Cho at the hearing.

“That’s not the law,” Richards said during the proceeding.

In his ruling, Cho said the 90-day notice provision is “inviolable no matter what

theory of eviction a foreclosing party has available to it.

“No matter what rights or ‘interest’ the foreclosing party assumes (including the right

to evict for non-payment of rent), it cannot evict without providing the minimum 90

day notice to bona fide tenants.”

Cho said that, after giving that notice, the bank would have the option of filing suit to

pursue the Tenant’s back rent or of evicting her.

As part of the judge’s ruling, he denied Richards’ request for attorney fees and

sanctions against Private National.

FIRM WINS MOTION TO QUASH FOR VICTIMIZED TENANT

Friday, March 9th, 2012

The firm represented a tenant against PNMAC Mortgage. The tenant had two separate unlawful detainer actions filed against her. Ronald Richards & Associates, APC takes cases where lawyers like to bully the underdog.  This case was part of the firm’s lower income program which helps tenants who are victimized by landlords.  The first unlawful detainer was filed after the tenant’s prior landlord lost the house in foreclosure in January of 2011. It was dismissed after a motion to dismiss was filed in March of 2011, due to the action being filed prematurely. A second unlawful detainer was filed in December of 2011. In February of 2012, the trial court heard a motion to quash. On March 7, 2012, the Court granted the motion to quash. A copy of the opinion and order is attached here:  

Dismissal Order  

A written opinion is extremely rare because most tenants cannot afford to litigate these issues.  They are already struggling with the their former landlord losing their home.  The publishing of the written opinion is intended to assist other tenants and their counsel from what is an abusive practice by law firms and banks.  

Here is the factual background and procedural history:  

Plaintiff PNMAC Mortgage purchased the property at issue at a foreclosure sale in January 2011. They were represented by Deborah Bass and Ellie Navid of the Law Offices of Deborah Bass. They are supposed to be experts in unlawful detainer actions.  At all times during the case, they refused to settle the case and sign a new lease with the tenant.  The defendant was a tenant of the prior owner. Plaintiff served defendant with a three day notice to pay rent or quit in December 2011, claiming that defendant failed to pay rent of $2,500 per month for a 10 month period from March 2011 thru November 2011. The rent was not paid and plaintiff brought the unlawful detainer action to evict defendant.  At no time was the tenant ever a real tenant of the banks.   

This legal fiction was created by Ellie Navid,  

Ellie Navid

 

who did not care that she was trying to assist her client in attempting to take illegal rent from the tenant.   The firm brought a motion to quash the service of the summons and first amended complaint pursuant to Delta Imports v. Municipal Court, 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1036 (1983), challenging the sufficiency of the complaint. Specifically, the tenant claimed that because plaintiffs took over the property by foreclosure, the tenant is entitled to a minimum 90 day notice to quit under the Federal Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”), rather than the 3 day pay rent or quit notice alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff through its attorneys contended that the 3 day pay rent or quit notice is legally sufficient because, regardless of the 90 day PTFA requirement, tenants still must pay the rent or be subject to only a 3 day pay or quit notice. Oral arguments were held on February 27, 2012 and the matter was taken under submission.  The firm argued for 45 minutes.  The argument was aggressive and engaging.  Three attorneys appeared for PNMAC from Deborah Bass’s firm. They were Deborah Bass, Ellie Navid, and Paul Tauger.  

Paul Tauger

 

A copy of the transcript of the oral argument is set forth here:  

Motion to Quash Transcript Hearing 

ANALYSIS & ORDER  

Motion to Quash  

Required Notice Period  

The firm argued that the complaint was insufficient as it alleged only a 3 day notice to pay rent or quit rather than a federally mandated 90 day notice period under the Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5220. The bank contended that only a 3 day notice is required in failure to pay rent cases under §1161(2) and not the PTFA 90 day notice.  

The applicable provision of the PTFA states: In the case of foreclosure … any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to:  

(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice; and  

(2) the rights of any bona fide tenant -  

(A) under any bona fide lease entered into before the notice of foreclosure to occupy the premises until the end of the remaining term of the lease ….  

In simple terms, a foreclosing party must provide a bona fide tenant a minimum 90 day notice before termination of the tenancy and must honor any remaining term of a bona fide lease. Plaintiff conceded that the complaint alleges only a 3 day notice, but argued, in essence, that the 90 day PTF A notice is applicable only when a foreclosing party seeks to evict based on the eviction alone, and that plaintiffs are not seeking eviction on that basis but rather on a failure to pay rent theory which requires only a 3day notice pursuant to § 1161 (2). Accepting this analysis, it is possible for a foreclosing party who would otherwise be barred from evicting a tenant for 90 days, to be able to effectuate an eviction before the 90 day period if a tenant failed to pay rent within that time.  

The Court ruled that the Plaintiffs theory reads into the PTFA something that it is silent on: a requirement that bona fide tenants continue to honor their rental obligations post foreclosure and that failure to do so gives rise to the right of the foreclosing party to evict the non-paying tenant. At first blush, plaintiff’s theory that upon foreclosure they step into the shoes of the prior landlord and therefore assumes the right of the landlord to evict for failure to pay rent on a 3 day notice has persuasive appeal from both a common sense and fairness perspective. After all, since subsection (a)(2)(A) of the PTFA binds the foreclosing party to honor any remaining term of a prior bona fide lease agreement, it only makes sense to hold the tenant to their responsibilities under the same bona fide lease agreement, that is, the tenant is entitled to the remainder of his lease on the condition that he continue to timely pay his rent as required by that lease. Without this implied corollary to PTFA (a)(2)(A), the landlord would be bound to allow the tenant to live out the remainder of the lease agreement rent free, which would be patently unjust. In accepting the theory that the PTF A requires both parties to honor their respective responsibilities for the remainder of the lease, one should also logically accept the converse of that theory: if the tenant does not continue to pay the rent, the foreclosing party is relieved of his/her obligation to honor the remainder of the lease term and, as plaintiff urges, should be allowed to evict the non-paying tenant with a 3 day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to CCP § 1161 (2).  

The Court agreed that even after foreclosure, there is an ongoing duty of the tenant to pay the rent in order for him/her to invoke the PTF A protections for the remaining term of the lease agreement. The Court also agreed that the tenant’s failure to pay rent during the remaining lease period relieves the landlord of his/her obligation to honor the remaining balance and provides the foreclosing party with the remedy of eviction under CCP § 1161, which requires only a 3 day notice. But how can this analysis be accorded with the 90 day notice requirement under the PTFA? More specifically, does the 90 day notice still apply when the theory of eviction is failure to pay rent?  In this case, PNMAC’s attorneys concocted a false tenancy between the bank and the tenant in possession after a foreclosure.  

The answer lies in a close examination of the specific language of the PTFA, which requires that “any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to … [providing to a bona fide tenant] a notice to vacate … at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice … (emphasis added).” Here, the applicable “interest” assumed by plaintiff in this action was the prior landlord’s right to demand defendant to continue to pay his/her rent or be subject to eviction for failure to do so; however, that interest is subject to and conditioned upon plaintiff providing the tenant a notice to vacate “at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice.” The language of the PTF A is unequivocal in this regard; no matter what rights or “interest” the foreclosing party assumes (including the right to evict for nonpayment of rent), it cannot evict without providing the minimum 90 day notice to bona fide tenants. In other words, the Court held that the 90 day notice period is inviolable no matter what theory of eviction a foreclosing party has available to it.  

Plaintiffs argued that in applying the PTF A in this manner in the non-payment of rent context, it allows for tenants to live rent free for a minimum of 90 days, which cannot be the intention of that statute to allow for such an unjust result. However, the 90 day PTFA notice period does not excuse the tenant from his/her rental obligations; it merely delays the remedy of eviction for a 90 day period. Following the 90 day notice, plaintiff is entitled to avail itself of all the rights and remedies the prior landlord had to seek redress for the tenant’s failure to pay rent, including eviction and the awarding of back rent, and holdover damages for the 90 day period.  In this case, the bank wanted rent for an entire year plus it wanted the Court to disregard the 90 days notice provision.  

Having found that the PTFA 90 day notice is applicable even in the failure to pay rent context, the Court correctly found that the defendant’s motion to quash service of the summons and complaint must be granted because the complaint fails to allege compliance with that statutory notice requirement.  

Now, the tenant may in the future, be faced with a third unlawful detainer from the same bank, an entity that she has never had a lease.  The firm will be right there with her defending her from any further attempts to violate his statutory rights.